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The massive stocks of foreign exchange reserves, mostly held in the form of U.S. T-Bonds by
emerging economies, are still an important puzzle. Why do emerging economies continue to
willingly loan to the United States despite the low rates of return? We propose that a dynamic
general equilibrium model incorporating international capital markets, characterized by a non-
centralized trading mechanism and U.S. T-Bonds as facilitators of trade, can provide an answer
to this question. Declining financial frictions in these over-the-counter (OTC) markets would
generate rising liquidity premiums on U.S. T-Bonds. Meanwhile, the higher liquidity prop-
erties of the U.S. T-Bonds would induce recipients of foreign investments, namely emerging
economies, to hold more liquidity, that is U.S. T-Bonds, in equilibrium. The prediction of our
model is confirmed by an empirical simultaneous equations approach considering an endoge-
nous relationship between OTC capital inflows and reserves holdings.
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1 Introduction
International reserves, mostly held in the form of U.S. T-Bonds by emerging economies, are
thought to have played a major role in shaping global financial flows and real interest rates
over the last decade. However, economists are still unclear about the root causes of the rapid
growth in reserve holdings by emerging economies. Most economists studying this topic point
to either risk or policy-related factors. The risk approach stresses the hedging role of reserve
assets against random sudden stops, whereas the policy approach focuses on reserve assets as
a tool in a policy of currency undervaluation.1
While these explanations admittedly provide important insights, one major challenge with
them is that the calibrated versions and/or forecasts of their models usually fail to match the
sheer size and trend of many emerging markets’ reserve accumulation by a large margin. Some
even call this failure an excess reserve accumulation puzzle (Summers, 2006; Jeanne and Ranciere,
2011). In an attempt to solve this puzzle, others have offered new theories on reserve determi-
nants.2 Yet, these studies mainly focus on empirical tests for new determinants. Far fewer have
suggested general equilibrium models of reserve determination. Thus, while progress on solving
the puzzle has been made, a fully-fledged analysis on the equilibrium relationship between re-
serve accumulation, interest rates, and net foreign asset positions remains to be done.
To that end, we construct a two-country dynamic general equilibrium (DGE) model of re-
serve determination. We use this framework to study how the three aforementioned variables
jointly evolve in response to changes in macro fundamentals, such as financial frictions in inter-
national capital markets and the supply of U.S. T-Bonds. Our model is novel, not just because it
takes a DGE approach, but because it considers a very important yet largely neglected attribute
of the reserve assets, liquidity.3 Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber (2004) argue that reserve
assets could facilitate foreign capital inflows into emerging markets by serving as aggregate
collateral. Moreover, reserve assets could also alleviate the loss from the repatriation of foreign
capital by serving as a means of buying them back (see Aizenman and Marion (2004)). What
is of importance is that despite these different roles, reserve assets could effectively serve as a
medium of exchange for emerging economies, as holding more of these assets would enhance
foreign capital inflows.
To reliably incorporate reserve asset liquidity into a DGE framework, we bring insights from
a new branch of monetary economics—with Lagos (2010) at the forefront—that pioneers a new
1 For a more comprehensive literature review, see Bernanke (2005); Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007a); Ghironi,
Lee, and Rebucci (2007); Gourinchas and Rey (2007); McGrattan and Prescott (2007); Warnock and Warnock (2009);
and Obstfeld, Shambaugh, and Taylor (2010).
2 See, for example, Bird and Rajan (2003), Rodrik (2006), Aizenman and Lee (2008), Cheung and Qian (2009),
and Obstfeld, Shambaugh, and Taylor (2010).
3 A recent empirical study by Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) demonstrates that U.S. Treasury
bonds have superb liquidity that is akin to the U.S. dollar.
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asset pricing model for which assets, in addition to the discounted value of future dividend
streams, can be valued for their endogenous liquidity properties.4 We take this insight further
and apply it to a global portfolio choice problem with endogenous changes in reserve assets’
liquidity property.
The main result of our model is straightforward. The sustained enhancement of reserve
assets’ liquidity may hold the key to understanding the recent upward trend in reserve ac-
cumulation by many emerging economies. The explanation for the endogenous and simulta-
neous change in reserve assets’ liquidity as well as reserve hoarding is as follows. Emerging
economies seek to make contracts with developed countries to bring foreign capital through
international capital markets. Importantly, in the present model, these markets do not use a
centralized trading mechanism, such as an exchange. Instead, agents from emerging and de-
veloped countries meet in a bilateral fashion and negotiate the terms of trade. Owing to im-
perfect credit and limited commitment, reserve assets can naturally emerge as a medium of
exchange for the acquisition of foreign capital.5 Consistent with empirical evidence, our model
also assumes that only the reserve asset, that is U.S. T-Bonds, is accepted as a means of payment
within international capital markets.6
Within this framework, reserve assets can carry a liquidity premium, which reflects their abil-
ity to facilitate transactions in international capital markets. A process of declining frictions,
such as, financial deregulation, in these markets expedites trade between agents. This enhances
the liquidity premium on the reserve asset and, thus, leads to low rates of return in equilibrium.
In this context, agents from emerging markets value the reserve assets’ higher liquidity proper-
ties more than their counterparts do. This is because foreign agents, being providers of foreign
capital, do not require any liquidity services from reserve assets in the international capital
markets. Eventually, this increases the equilibrium level of reserve hoarding by home agents.7
4 With ad hoc assumptions, such as a cash-in-advance constraint, accounting for endogenous change in asset
liquidity is virtually impossible. This is where the monetary search framework’s usefulness comes in.
5 This assumption of reserve assets, namely, U.S. T-Bonds, being used as a direct medium of exchange instead
of serving a more practically plausible role, such as collateral, can be justified on the grounds of recent monetary
search literature. Lagos (2011); Venkateswaran and Wright (2013); Geromichalos and Herrenbrueck (2013) demon-
strate that assets can effectively act as media of exchange despite multiple contractual differences, e.g., collateral,
REPO, and secondary OTC assets. Furthermore, employing the model with assets as a direct medium of exchange
can avoid unnecessary complexities.
6 Deeper insights into why U.S. assets may be a superior means of payment in transactions have been offered in
the literature. Devereux and Shi (2013) construct a dynamic general equilibrium model of a vehicle currency where
agents prefer an indirect trade using the U.S. dollar to a direct trade using their own currencies. One could also
refer to the intuition of Rocheteau (2011) and Lester, Postlewaite, and Wright (2012) where asymmetric information
on different assets would give rise to one particular asset as a sole medium of exchange.
7 We admit the importance of the role of emerging market’s public sectors, i.e., central banks, in the emergence
of rapid reserve accumulation. Nonetheless, analyzing the phenomena purely from the perspective of a private
sector’s portfolio choice is not implausible either. This is because most emerging economies are channeling their
private sector’s foreign asset savings through the official sector. In other words, the reserve assets held by the
central bank in emerging economies are indirectly controlled by private sector decisions through capital controls,
the issuance of quasi-collateralized sterilization bonds, and so on. See Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas (2008) for
more empirical observations that justify this approach.
2
Note that this new liquidity-based explanation relies on the premise that international capi-
tal markets are characterized by decentralized trading. This assumption is by no means a pure
theoretical abstraction. Over the last decade, the global economy has witnessed the emergence
of foreign capital inflows into emerging economies, especially those associated with newly de-
veloped financial instruments, such as hedge fund investments, leveraged buyout funds by
private equity firms, wholesale funding by multinational investment banks, and so on. What
is crucial is that these new types of private investment inflows (consistent with the present
model’s assumptions) are mostly carried out through OTC markets, such as those described in
Duffie, Gaˆrleanu, and Pedersen (2005).
To further justify the model framework, as well as associated predictions, we conduct a
quantitative empirical analysis. First, we construct various measures for aggregate OTC in-
flows for a collection of 71 emerging and developing economies using data from 1990 to 2011.
For the measure based on venture capital inflows, we use new data collected from the FactSet
database.8 Then, we inspect the relationship between OTC inflows and various other macro
variables in accordance with our theoretical predictions. Figure 1 demonstrates good heuris-
tic empirical support for our model framework and predictions, showing a rapidly increasing
trend for aggregate OTC inflows. More interestingly, the trend exhibits a close connection with
the upward trend for reserve accumulation.
For a more rigorous econometric analysis, we set up a testable hypothesis of the model that
foreign OTC inflows, triggered by a decline in financial frictions, should be tightly linked to
the recent upsurge in emerging markets’ reserve holdings. In order to account for endogene-
ity between the two key variables (implied by the model), we adopt a simultaneous equations
estimation approach, following Imbs (2004). Through various econometric specifications and
robustness checks, we find strong empirical support for our liquidity-based theory of interna-
tional reserves determination.
2 Related Literature
Analyzing reserve accumulation from the viewpoint of liquidity adds new insights to the exist-
ing literature. Some prominent studies, such as, Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas (2008); Men-
doza, Quadrini, and Rios-Rull (2009), emphasize local assets’ lack of pledgeability or emerging
markets’ financial underdevelopment as major sources of the excess global demand for U.S. as-
sets, such as U.S. T-Bonds. However, these arguments are not entirely satisfactory given that the
rapid reserve accumulation trend does not seem to have slowed down even in the aftermath of
the U.S. financial market turmoil and the U.S. debt fiasco. By restricting the two-country model
to a symmetric financial asset case in terms of pledgeability aspects, our model does not suffer
8 Section 6 will explain in detail how different measures for OTC capital inflows are constructed.
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from the same problem. The liquidity-based theory provides a more natural way of supporting
sustained reserve accumulation even in the aftermath of the U.S. asset crisis.
Another advantage of our approach is that it provides a framework that is not specific to
East Asia. Aizenman and Marion (2004); Durdue, Mendoza, and Terrones (2007); Jeanne and
Ranciere (2011) argue that a series of emerging market crises in the 1990s gave rise to East Asia’s
extraordinary demand for foreign reserve assets. Meanwhile, Summers (2006) and Dooley,
Folkerts-Landau, and Peter (2005) suggest that reserve accumulation is a direct consequence
of East Asia’s industrial policies aiming to achieve undervalued currencies. However, China
and India were not hit by the Asian financial crisis, and many East Asian countries switched
to an almost fully flexible exchange regime after the crisis.9 In this regard, the present model
complements East Asian-based explanations by providing an extra liquidity channel through
which demand for reserve assets can be boosted.
The studies of Cheung and Qian (2009) and Qian and Steiner (2014) are two most similar in
terms of the facilitator role that international reserves play. Cheung and Qian (2009) show that
international reserves serve as a barometer of financial health and, thus, facilitate foreign capi-
tal inflows and foreign direct investment (FDI). Qian and Steiner (2014) take this facilitator role
further. They argue that reserves can even change the risk premium of foreign equity invest-
ment (PEI), thereby altering the composition of foreign capital inflows between FDI and PEI.
Our approach differs to these in that we specifically evaluate the relationship between reserves
and OTC inflows both theoretically and empirically, which no other existing studies have at-
tempted.
As already pointed out, this study attempts to bring intuitive insights from the growing
monetary search literature that studies the broader notion of assets as facilitators of trade,
e.g., Geromichalos, Licari, and Suarez-Lledo (2007); Lagos and Rocheteau (2008); Lagos (2011);
Lester, Postlewaite, and Wright (2012); Zhang (2014). As in our study, some of these studies
extend these insights by applying the notion of asset liquidity to traditional macro puzzles
related to asset pricing and portfolio choice theory. Lagos (2010) proposes a framework en-
riched with aggregate dividend shocks to resolve the equity premium puzzle. Geromichalos and
Simonovska (2014) also bring the monetary search literature closer to questions related to inter-
national portfolio diversification. Similarly to the present study, they consider a two-country
environment characterized by assets’ role as media of exchange, which plays a crucial role in
rationalizing the home asset bias puzzle. Jung and Lee (2014) too adopt a two-country mon-
etary search framework where both money and nominal bonds serve as a media of exchange,
and investigate if endogenous liquidity properties of both assets could explain the uncovered
interest parity puzzle. Compared to these studies, a main contribution of the present study is
to explore how the OTC international capital market affects interest rates and the asymmetric
9 Furthermore, empirical evidence is not in favor of their arguments on many occasions. See Aizenman and Lee
(2007) for the mixed empirical evidence on the conventional explanations.
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distribution of asset holdings across countries.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3 describes the physical environ-
ment of our model. Section 4 explains the optimal behavior of agents in the economy. Section
5 characterizes the equilibrium. Section 6 sets up a testable hypothesis for the proposed model,
formulates empirical specifications, and presents the estimation results. Concluding remarks
follow in Section 7.
3 Physical Environment
Time is discrete, and the horizon is infinite. There are two countries, home and foreign. The
home country represents a developing country, i.e., China, while the foreign country represents
a developed country, i.e., the United States. Each country has a unit measure of agents who
live forever. For notational simplicity, I shall henceforth call home and foreign agents H and F,
respectively.
Each period is divided into three sub-periods for which economic activities differ. During
the first sub-period, every agent, regardless of where she resides, is endowed with a production
technology that allows her to transform each unit of labor into a unit of numeraire goods. These
goods are identical, so all agents are basically self-sufficient in numeraire goods consumption.
Yet, the agents can also choose to trade these goods for two different financial assets, i.e., home
and foreign assets. What is critical here is that trade for financial assets in this sub-period takes
place in one centralized, or Walrasian, market (CM).
The two financial assets are perfectly divisible and meant to represent emerging market debt
and U.S. T-Bonds, respectively. For tractability, Lucas (1978) trees are adopted. In each country,
a new set of trees is born in the CM every period. Each unit of the tree delivers one unit of
numeraire goods in the next period’s CM, and then it dies. This simplifies the maturity of both
bonds to one period.10 Any agent can purchase and trade shares of these trees at the ongoing
market prices: ψ and ψ∗ for home and foreign assets, respectively. The supply of these trees for
each country is fixed over time and is denoted by T and T ∗, respectively.
During the second sub-period, H and F both visit the foreign investment market (FIM) to
engage in anonymous bilateral trade with search frictions; thus, FIM is an OTC market. Im-
portantly, it is assumed that only F is endowed with the technology to produce capital goods,
from which H obtains utility, which motivates H and F to trade with each other.11 Emerging
economies benefit from these goods for a variety of reasons, such as employment opportunities
and positive technology spillovers. These benefits explain why H seeks to acquire the capital
10 One could instead introduce multi-period bonds, which would not change the qualitative implications of our
model. The one-period bond assumption is imposed purely for simplification.
11 Real world examples of capital goods could be foreign investment projects for building infrastructure, en-
hancing local firms’ management skills and knowhow, developing financial market structure, and so on.
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goods from F in the model. In this sense, the recipient of foreign investment projects, i.e., H is
identified as a buyer, whereas F is labeled as a seller in this FIM.
Note also that, it is assumed that an exchange in the FIM requires a medium of exchange
(MOE). Motivated by the theoretical arguments and empirical evidence given in footnotes 5 and
6, only foreign assets, that is U.S. T-Bonds, can serve as a direct medium of exchange. Lastly,
for simplicity, this model abstracts from bargaining considerations. Accordingly, the buyer, H ,
is assumed to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the seller, F , in any bilateral meeting.
In the third sub-period, all agents are back in their local country and visit their own decen-
tralized markets, where bilateral and anonymous trade for specialized goods takes place. This
restriction precludes our model from considering international goods trade. Following Lagos
and Wright (2005), the local decentralized market is termed DM henceforth, and goods here
shall be called (special) local goods. Since the key liquidity mechanism of this model is derived
from the FIM, the DMs are set up to be as simple as possible. The two DMs are symmetric.
Analogous to the FIM, exchange has to be quid pro quo, and only local assets can serve as the
means for payment in the DM.12 Furthermore, the take-it-or-leave-it offer by the buyer of the spe-
cial goods is again assumed.
Time preference with a parameter β ∈ (0, 1) applies only between periods but not between
sub-periods. H consumes in all sub-periods, and she supplies labor in the first and third sub-
periods. Let UH(x,X, l, L, κ) represent H’s preferences, where x and X are consumption in the
DM and CM, respectively, while l and L denote labor hours in the DM and CM, respectively.
Last, κ captures the amount of capital goods obtained from F in the FIM. Agent F consumes
only in the first and third periods, and she supplies labor in the second and third sub-periods.
Let UF (x,X, l, L, h) represent F ’s preferences, where the only new variable is h, which denotes
the labor units employed in the FIM. Following the traditional monetary search literature, the
quasi-linear utility functional form is adopted as
UH(x,X, l, L, κ) = U(X)− L+ u(κ) + u(x)− l,
UF (x,X, l, L, h) = U(X)− L− c(h) + u(x)− l.
Thus, the usual assumption for the utility and cost functions in the literature applies: u′ >
0, U ′ > 0, u′′ < 0, U ′′ < 0, U ′(0) = u′(0) = +∞, c′ > 0, c′′ > 0.13
Next, search frictions in the FIM and DM need to be defined. First, in the FIM, a random
match between H and F is assumed with a matching function, M(B, S), which indicates the
total number of matches in the FIM when the masses of buyers and sellers equal B and S,
12 We do not intend to offer a theory as to why only local assets are accepted as a means of payment. In this
regard, we suggest seeing Geromichalos and Simonovska (2014) who show that local assets can indeed endoge-
nously arise as a superior medium of exchange in local markets with an introduction of tiny transaction costs
associated with local trade using foreign assets.
13 For simplicity, it is assumed that c(l) = l, which is of no importance for our main implications.
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respectively. This matching function, M , is assumed to be increasing in both arguments and is
homogeneous of degree one. As a result, the arrival rate of buyers (sellers) to an arbitrary seller
(buyer), χf and χh, respectively, can be expressed as
χf =
M(B, S)
S
= M
(
B
S
, 1
)
≡ f(θ),
χh =
M(B, S)
B
= M
(
1,
S
B
)
≡ θχf ,
where θ is market tightness, and equals S/B. It is finally assumed that buyers always visit the
FIM and sellers get to visit the FIM with probability δ ∈ (0, 1), which is meant to capture the
degree of international financial market integration. Under this assumption, market tightness
is then given by θ = δ/1 = δ.
Search frictions in the DM closely follow Lagos and Wright (2005). In each of the DMs, two
agents i and j are drawn at random. This leads to three possible events. The probability that
i consumes what j produces, but not vice versa, namely, a single coincidence, is denoted as σ.
Symmetrically, the probability that j consumes what i produces but not vice versa is also σ.
In a single-coincidence meeting, the agent who wishes to consume is called the buyer and the
agent who produces is called the seller. The probability that neither wants anything the other
produces is 1− 2σ, which implies σ ≤ 1/2.14 Last, σ is assumed to be symmetric across the two
countries. Figure 2 summarizes the timing of the events in this model economy.
4 Value Functions and Optimal Behavior
Let us begin with an agent’s value function in the CM. Consider H who enters this market with
a portfolio of home and foreign assets (a, a∗). The Bellman’s equation is then expressed by
WH(a, a∗) = max
{X,L,â,â∗}
{
U(X)− L+ ΩH(â, â∗)},
s.t. X + ψâ+ ψ∗â∗ = L+ a+ a∗,
where ψ and ψ∗ stand for the prices of home and foreign asset respectively and variables with
hats denote next period’s choices. It can be easily verified that, at the optimum, X = X¯ . Re-
placing L from the H’s budget constraint into WH(a, a∗) yields
WH(a, a∗) = U(X¯)− X¯ + (a+ a∗) + max
{â,â∗}
{− ψâ− ψ∗â∗ + ΩH(â, â∗)}. (1)
14 The last potentially possible case, wherein both parties like what the other produces, is ignored for simplicity.
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It is important to note that no wealth effects for the H’s portfolio choice exists following from
the quasi-linearity of U . Furthermore, WH(a, a∗) is linear in state variables and therefore, can
be simplified as
WH(a, a∗) = ΛH + a+ a∗. (2)
Next, consider F’s Bellman’s equation. Regarding her asset holdings, she is assumed to
carry no home assets as she leaves the CM for simplicity.15 Thus, when the F enters the CM, she
can only hold foreign assets that she received during trade in either of the preceding FIM and
DM, i.e., a∗ is the only state variable for F . This gives the CM value function of F as
W F (a∗) = max
{X,L,â∗}
{
U(X)− L+ ΩF (â∗)},
s.t. X + ψ∗â∗ = L+ a∗.
Since X = X¯ at the optimum again, the Bellman’s equation for F can be rewritten as
W F (a∗) = U(X¯)− X¯ + a∗ + max
{â∗}
{− ψ∗â∗ + ΩF (â∗)}. (3)
The quasi-linearity assumption also simplifies the e.q.(3) as an affine function16
W F (a∗) = ΛF + a∗. (4)
Once the CM closes, both proceed to the FIM. The matching probabilities (or arrival rates)
for the two types of agents (H and F ) are exogenously given by χh and χf . Let κ denote the
amount of capital goods transferred from F to H in the FIM, while b∗ stands for the total units
of foreign assets received by F in exchange for the κ given toH . These terms will be determined
through bargaining which will be studied in details later. For now, it is understood that b∗ and κ
will, in general, be functions of the foreign asset holdings of both H and F within a match. Let
a˜∗ denote the amount of foreign asset holdings that an agent expects a potential counterparty
to carry. The following then shows the value functions for H and F during the FIM.
ΩH(a, a∗) = χh
{
u(κ) + V H(a, a∗ − b∗)}+ (1− χh)V H(a, a∗), (5)
ΩF (a∗) = χf
{
V F (a∗ + b∗)− c(κ)}+ (1− χf )V F (a∗), (6)
15 Intuitively, the F does not require any liquidity service from home assets in any of the FIM and her local DM.
However, there may be a case where the cost of carrying home assets becomes zero in equilibrium. In this case,
F may choose to hold home assets purely as a savings instrument. In order to avoid this situation, one could
possibly introduce an infinitesimally small cost of participating the CM in line with Chiu and Molico (2010). This
would ensure no home asset holdings by the F all the time. One can also refer to Rocheteau and Wright (2005) for
a careful proof of the result that sellers do not hold any means of payment.
16 The definition of ΛH and ΛF are obvious from e.q.(1) and (3) respectively.
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where V H and V F denote a value function for H and F respectively in the following local DMs,
and κ = κ(a∗, a˜∗), b∗ = b∗(a∗, a˜∗).
Finally consider value functions in the last sub-period. For the home country’s local DM, let
F (a˜) be the distribution of home asset holdings among home agents. Let q also be the quantity
of (special) local goods produced by the seller, and n the total payment in the units of home
assets, made to the seller by the buyer. These terms will also be determined through bargaining
explained later. The Bellman’s equation then is
V H(a, a∗) = σ
{
u(q(a)) + βWH(a− n(a), a∗)} (7)
+ σ
∫ {−q(a˜) + βWH(a+ n(a˜), a∗)} dF (a˜)
+ (1− 2σ)βWH(a, a∗),
where q = q(a) and n = n(a).
The first line captures the payoff from buying q(a) and going to the next period’s CM with
asset holdings of (a−n(a), a∗). The second line means the expected payoff from selling q(a˜) and
going to the next period’s CM with (a+n(a˜), a∗). It is easy to see that only the amount of assets
that the buyer brings into the DM matters for the determination of the terms of trade. The last
line is the payoff from going to the next period’s CM with no trade history in the current DM.
F ’s value function in the DM can be computed in a similar way. Using the same intuition, the
Bellman’s equation for F can be expressed as
V F (a∗) = σ
{
u(q(a∗)) + βW F (a∗ − n(a∗))} (8)
+ σ
∫ {−q(a˜∗) + βW F (a∗ + n(a˜∗))} dF (a˜∗) (9)
+ (1− 2σ)βW F (a∗).
Having figured out the value functions for all agents, we describe how the terms of trade in
the DM and FIM are determined respectively. Since the DM follows after the FIM, the terms of
trade in the FIM should be critically affected by the terms of trade in the DMs. For this reason,
backward induction is employed. Following the previous section, the terms of trade in any
bilateral meeting within the home DM are {q(a), n(a)}, where a is the amount of home asset
holdings that the buyer has brought into the bargaining. With take-it-or-leave-it (TIOLI) offers
by the buyer, the bargaining problem is then
max
{q,n}
{
u(q) + β
[
WH (a− n, a∗)−WH (a, a∗)]} ,
s.t. 1. q ≤ β [WH (a+ n, a∗)−WH (a, a∗)] ,
2. n ≤ a.
9
The buyer aims to maximize the (special) local goods consumption utility. At the same time,
she also needs to minimize the loss from giving up n in exchange for q in a present discounted
form. This is what the objective function in the bargaining problem describes. By the same logic,
gains from obtaining n must be greater than or equal to the cost of producing q for the seller.
Moreover, the amount of assets handed over to the seller can not exceed what the buyer owns
at the time of negotiation. These explain the two budget constraints. Exploiting the linearity of
the WH(a, a∗) in e.q.(1), the bargaining problem can be rewritten as
max
{q,n}
{u(q)− βn} ,
s.t. q = βn,
with the resource constraint, n ≤ a.
By the symmetric DM assumption across two countries, the bargaining problem in the for-
eign country’s local DM can be written identically.
max
{q∗,n∗}
{
u(q∗) + β
[
W F (a∗ − n∗)−W F (a∗)]} ,
s.t. 1. q∗ ≤ β [W F (a∗ + n∗)−W F (a∗)] ,
2. n∗ ≤ a∗.
The linearity of the W F (a∗) in e.q.(3) again simplifies the problem as
max
{q∗,n∗}
{u(q∗)− βn∗} ,
s.t. q∗ = βn∗,
with the resource constraint, n∗ ≤ a∗. The following lemma describes the bargaining solutions
during the two DMs in detail.
Lemma 1. Define q˜ = {q : u′(q) = 1} and aˇ = q˜/β. Bargaining solutions for the home and foreign
country’s DM are respectively given by q(a) = min{q˜, βa}, n(a) = min{aˇ, a}, q∗(a∗) = min{q˜, βa∗},
and n∗(a∗) = min{aˇ, a∗}.
Proof. It can be easily verified that the suggested solution satisfies the necessary and sufficient
conditions for maximization.
Due to no hold-up problem understanding the lemma above is straightforward. Bargaining
solutions critically depend upon the buyer’s local asset holdings brought into the bargaining.
When her local asset holdings are short of the threshold level, aˇ, she would purchase as much
q as her local assets holdings allow. On the contrary, if her local asset holdings are greater than
10
or equal to aˇ then, she would only spend a portion of the assets such that she could purchase
only up to the optimal amount of q˜.
Now, consider a meeting in the FIM betweenH with foreign asset holdings of a∗h and F with
a∗f . Assuming again the TIOLI offer by H , the bargaining problem is given by
max
{κ,b∗}
{
u(κ) +
[
V H (a, a∗h − b∗)− V H (a, a∗h)
]}
,
s.t. c(κ) ≤ [V F (a∗f + b∗)− V F (a∗f)] ,
with a resource constraint, b∗ ≤ a∗h. Intuition of this bargaining problem is identical to the
DM case. H chooses the terms of trade to maximize her surplus subject to the participation
constraint for F . If one substitutes V H and V F from e.q.(7) and e.q.(8) into the expression
above, the bargaining problem can be simplified as
max
{κ,b∗}
{u(κ)− βb∗} ,
s.t. c(κ) ≤ βb∗ + σ [u(q(a∗f + b∗))− βn(a∗f + b∗)]− σ [u(q(a∗f ))− βn(a∗f )] ,
with the same resource constraint, b∗ ≤ a∗h.
It is understood that the q(·), n(·) are described by the solutions to the DM bargaining prob-
lem described earlier. The participation constraint for the F in this problem deserves some intu-
itive explanation. Unlike the DM’s bargaining case, the F’s gain in exchange for κ comes from
two sources: the asset’s store of value, i.e., βb∗ and medium of exchange value in the subse-
quent DM, i.e., σ
[
u(q(a∗f + b
∗))− βn(a∗f + b∗)
]−σ [u(q(a∗f ))− βn(a∗f )]. This constraint turns out
to allow the FIM trade to essentially drive the liquidity mechanism of the model later. Lemma
2 summarizes the bargaining solution.
Lemma 2. Define κ˜ = {κ : u′(κ)/c′(κ) = 1}. a¯∗f is such that σu(βa¯∗f ) + (1 − σ)βa¯∗f = σu(q˜) + (1 −
σ)βaˇ− c(κ˜), where q˜ and aˇ are defined in Lemma 1. Below, we also define f as a function of a∗f and κ to
simplify solutions.
f
(
a∗f , κ
)
=

c(κ)/β if a∗f ≥ aˇ,{
c(κ)− σ[u(q˜)− u(βa∗f ) + q˜ − βa∗f ]
}
/β if max{a¯∗f , aˇ− a∗h} ≤ a∗f ≤ aˇ,{
f : c(κ) = (1− σ)βf + σ [u(β(a∗f + f))− u(βa∗f )]} if a∗f ≤ max{a¯∗f , aˇ− a∗h}.
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Under a parameter space such that c(κ˜) < βaˇ+ σ [u(q˜)− q˜], the bargaining solution is as follows.17
If a∗h ≤ f
(
a∗f , κ˜
)
then, κ =
{
κ : a∗h = f
(
a∗f , κ
)}
and b∗ = a∗h,
If a∗h ≥ f
(
a∗f , κ˜
)
and a∗f ≥ a¯∗f then, κ = κ˜ and b∗ = f
(
a∗f , κ˜
)
,
If a∗h ≥ f
(
a∗f , κ˜
)
and a∗f ≤ a¯∗f then, (κ, b∗) is such that κ > κ˜, b∗ < a∗h, b∗ < aˇ− a∗f , b∗ = f(a∗f , κ).
Proof. See appendix
Lemma 2 can be intuitively interpreted with an assistance of Figure 3 in which a˜∗h is de-
fined as follows. a˜∗h = {a∗h : c(κ˜) = σu(q(a∗h)) + (1− σ)βa∗h}. First thing to notice here is that the
bargaining solution is affected not only by a∗h but also a
∗
f . This feature is again attributed to a
specific timing of the FIM and DM introduced in this model. After the FIM, F needs to come
back home and to visit the local DM where foreign assets are accepted as means of payment.
Knowing this, her participation constraint for accepting the offer from H has to be linked to the
liquidity constraint in the subsequent local DM.
Before we explain the bargaining solution in detail, we provide intuition for various terms
that appear in Lemma 2. The term κ˜ stands for the socially efficient level of output in the FIM.
The threshold level, a¯∗f is the amount of pre-bargaining foreign asset holdings by F such that
the FIM bargaining outcome brings about κ˜ and post-bargaining foreign asset holdings of F ,
equal to aˇ. F intuitively experiences a shift in the liquidity value of foreign assets around this
bliss point. If her foreign assets holdings exceed this point, she would effectively enjoy a higher
bargaining power. Otherwise, she would become more desperate and, face less favorable terms
of trade. Therefore, a¯∗f critically affects the FIM liquidity constraint for F . The function f(a
∗
f , κ˜)
represents a threshold level of foreign asset holdings of H , which critically depends on the
F ’s foreign asset holdings. As with typical TIOLI bargaining problems in this type of models,
H obtains the first best outcome if her asset holdings exceed that threshold level, otherwise
she would end up with a less favorable outcome. Naturally, this function is increasing in a∗f ,
intuitively implying a lesser degree of desperation for foreign assets by F with greater pre-
bargaining level of a∗f . In fact, the line highlighted in red in Figure 3 exactly corresponds to this
threshold function, f(a∗f , κ˜).
Given this discussion, it is intuitive to interpret the FIM bargaining solution. There are 6 re-
gions of different bargaining solutions depending on the combination of {a∗h, a∗f}. Consider the
situation where the liquidity holdings of F are plentiful, i.e., the amount of foreign assets held
by F already satisfies the first best liquidity amount (aˇ) in the subsequent local DM. In this case,
17 The other potential parameter space case where βaˇ+ σ [u(q˜)− q˜] ≤ c(κ˜) is relegated to appendix. As a matter
of fact, this second case is nested by the first one. For this reason, only the latter will be considered for the rest of
the analysis.
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theH’s foreign asset holdings solely determine the terms of trade because the F ’s expected sur-
plus from obtaining foreign assets during the FIM trade only stems from a store value of the
asset (dividend payment in the next period’s CM). Given this observation, if the H’s foreign
asset holdings happen to be greater than or equal to the amount required to purchase the first
best κ˜, i.e., a∗h ≥ f
(
a∗f , κ˜
)
, then, she would only give up the amount just enough to cover the κ˜.
On the other hand, if she is short of the amount for the κ˜, i.e., a∗h ≤ f
(
a∗f , κ˜
)
, then, she would
give up all her foreign asset holdings and purchase κ as much as possible. These two situations
are respectively illustrated in region 1 and 2 of Figure 3.
When the F ’s foreign asset holdings fall short of aˇ then, the liquidity factor kicks in to alter
the participation constraint for F during the FIM bargaining. Suppose {a∗h, a∗f} initially lies in
region 1, and suddenly a∗f falls below aˇ (region 3). This would enforce the F’s liquidity con-
straint in the subsequent DM to bind. As a result, the F would appreciate the acquisition of
foreign assets during the FIM trade more. This in turn would bring about more favorable terms
of trade for the H. Therefore the latter would be able to obtain κ˜ with less amount of foreign
assets handed over compared to the region 1 case. Exactly same reasoning applies to the shift
from region 2 to region 4. Given the same amount of foreign asset holdings transferred to F , the
latter would agree to provide more κ in region 4 than region 2. Finally, H obtains κ˜ in region
3. Yet, she receives less than κ˜ in region 4 since she is liquidity constrained in this case, i.e.,
a∗h ≤ f
(
a∗f , κ˜
)
.
Region 5 represents a situation where the discrepancy between agents’ foreign asset hold-
ings is somewhat extreme. In this case, F faces a severe liquidity constraint in the following
local DM while H holds a lot of foreign assets. Hence, F ’s rather extreme desperation for liq-
uidity basically drives up the liquidity property of foreign assets to the point where she would
be willing to accept very bad terms of trade, i.e., κ > κ˜ and b∗ < a∗h.
18
Lastly, region 6 implies the situation in which the liquidity in the economy dries up most.
H would give up her entire foreign assets to acquire κ as much as possible. Since the first best
liquidity amount for F can not be met anyway even after combining the H’s foreign asset hold-
ings, i.e., a∗h + a
∗
f < aˇ, the amount of goods produced would be strictly less than the first best
outcome, κ˜.
With all bargaining solutions in place, one can proceed to derive the objective function of
the representative agent and describe optimal behavior. The aim of the objective function is to
figure out agent’s optimal portfolio choice. Consider the objective function for H first. To that
end, substitute e.q.(7) into e.q.(5) and lead the emerging expression for ΩH(a, a∗) by one period.
18 Notice here that there even exist some part of region 5 where the sum of foreign asset holdings by both H and
F falls short of aˇ, and yet H would get more than κ˜
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This would generate the following.
ΩH(âh, â
∗
h) = βâ
∗
h + χh
[
u(κ(â∗h, â
∗
f ))− βb∗(â∗h, â∗f )
]
(10)
+ βâh + σ [u(q(âh))− βn(âh)]
+ βΛH + σ
∫ {−q(a˜) + βWH(n(a˜), 0)} dF (a˜).
The three lines of this expression represent different benefits at different sub-periods for
H who enters the FIM with a portfolio of (âh, â∗h). The first line corresponds to the benefit
from holding foreign assets until the beginning of next period. The first term indicates the
discounted vale of dividends at the next period’s CM while the second term shows the net
surplus from the FIM trade. Notice that this net surplus depends upon her belief on the F ’s
foreign asset holdings (â∗f ) since the latter would affect the FIM terms of trade. The second line
analogously stands for the discounted value of home asset dividends as well as the net surplus
from participating in the subsequent local DM as a buyer. Last line implies the constant benefit
that does not depend on the H’s portfolio choice, i.e., next period CM’s net consumption utility
gain plus the net surplus in the subsequent local DM as a seller.
The next step is to plug e.q.(10) into WH(a, a∗) in e.q.(1). Focusing on the terms inside the
maximum operator of e.q.(1), i.e., ignoring the terms that do not affect the choice variables, one
can derive the H’s objective function as follows.
JH(âh, â
∗
h) = [−ψ + β] âh + [−ψ∗ + β] â∗h (11)
+ σ [u(q(âh))− βn(âh)]
+ χh
[
u(κ(â∗h, â
∗
f ))− βb∗(â∗h, â∗f )
]
.
Maximization of the above function with respect to (âh, â∗h) fully describes the optimal asset
holdings of H in every period. Conforming with the literature, the interpretation of e.q.(11) is
standard. The first line represents the net cost of carrying one unit of home and foreign assets
respectively from today’s CM into tomorrow’s CM. The second and third line expresses the
expected surplus from carrying the home and foreign assets into the DM and FIM respectively.
What is worth noting here is that the third line in e.q.(11) depends on the terms κ and b∗,
which in turn depend on the the bargaining protocol in the FIM. Given H’s choice of â∗h and
beliefs on the â∗f , she can end up in different branches of the bargaining solution as shown in
Lemma 2 and Figure 3. This leads to different functional forms for the JH(âh, â∗h) with respect
to the different regions. Lemma 3 presents an auxiliary result that highlights some important
properties of the region specific JH(âh, â∗h).
Lemma 3. Define JHi (âh, â∗h), i = 1, · · · , 6 asH’s objective function in region i. Then the partial deriva-
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tive with respect to the second argument, â∗h in each region can be expressed as follows.
∂JH1 (âh, â
∗
h)
∂â∗h
=
∂JH3 (âh, â
∗
h)
∂â∗h
=
∂JH5 (âh, â
∗
h)
∂â∗h
= −ψ∗ + β,
∂JH2 (âh, â
∗
h)
∂â∗h
=
∂JH4 (âh, â
∗
h)
∂â∗h
= −ψ∗ + β + χhβ
{
u′(κ)
c′(κ)
− 1
}
,
∂JH6 (âh, â
∗
h)
∂â∗h
= −ψ∗ + β + χhβ
{
u′(κ)
c′(κ)
[
(1− σ) + σu′(β(â∗h + â∗f ))
]− 1}
Proof. See the appendix
F ’s objective function should take a simpler form than the H’s since her optimal choice
would not depend upon the H’s choice at all. Following the same steps as in the H’s case,
substitute e.q.(8) into e.q.(6) and lead the emerging expression for ΩF (a∗) by one period to get
ΩF (â∗f ) = βâ
∗
f + σ
[
u(q(â∗f ))− βn(â∗f )
]
(12)
+ βΛF + σ
∫ {−q(a˜∗) + βW F (n(a˜∗))} dF (a˜∗).
This expression can be interpreted in a similar manner to the e.q.(10). Notice here that unlike
the H’s case, F does not appreciate the liquidity properties of foreign assets within the FIM
trade since H would exploit the whole surplus from the take-it-or-leave-it offer. This fact leads
to a lot more concise form of the objective function for F . Plugging e.q.(12) into e.q.(3) and
focusing on the terms inside the maximum operator, one can derive the F ’s objective function
as
JF (â∗f ) = [−ψ∗ + β] â∗f + σ
[
u(q(â∗f ))− βn(â∗f )
]
, (13)
where the first term stands for the cost of carrying foreign assets into the local DM and the
second term captures the expected surplus term as in e.q.(11).
Based on the two objective functions, one can consider equilibrium characteristics of home
and foreign asset prices. As a matter of fact, it would be easy to verify whether the cost of carry-
ing asset terms in e.q.(11) and (13) are non-negative or not in equilibrium. The next lemma does
this verification by stating important results regarding the sign of the cost terms in equilibrium.
Lemma 4. In any equilibrium, the following two conditions must hold.
ψ ≥ β and ψ∗ ≥ β.
Proof. See appendix
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Notice that the β is the so-called fundamental asset value, i.e., the price that agents would be
willing to pay for one unit of the asset if neither FIM nor DMs existed. The non-negative sign
of the cost terms assigns a very intuitive meaning to the objective functions of agents. Agents
wish to bring assets into either of the FIM and DM in order to facilitate trade. However, they
face a trade-off because carrying these assets is not free, i.e., the first line in e.q.(11) and (13)).
This eventually gives rise to the optimal portfolio choice problem of agents. In what follows,
each agent’s optimal portfolio choice problem is rigorously studied.
First, consider F ’s problem which is easier. The following lemma describes the optimal
portfolio choice of F taking ψ and ψ∗ as given.
Lemma 5. A foreign agent’s optimal choice of foreign asset holdings satisfies the following. If ψ∗ = β
then, the optimal foreign asset holdings of F should be greater than or equal to aˇ. On the other hand, if
ψ∗ > β then, there exists an unique level of foreign asset holdings, a˜∗f such that a˜∗f ∈ (0, aˇ) and
ψ∗ − β = σβ
{
u′(q(a˜∗f ))− 1
}
.
Proof. See appendix
A standard marginal cost-benefit analysis can be applied to interpret the optimal condition
in Lemma 5. F at the optimum must choose to hold the amount of foreign assets such that the
marginal benefit (σβ{u′(q(a˜∗f )) − 1}) equals to the marginal cost of holding additional unit of
foreign assets (ψ∗−β). This optimal condition in turn implies the usual downward sloping asset
demand curve, i.e., a negative relationship between ψ∗ and a˜∗f , due to u
′′(·) < 0. For instance,
when the cost of carrying foreign assets falls to zero, i.e., ψ∗ = β, the optimality requires that F
should hold the maximum possible amount of the foreign asset, aˇ.
H’s optimal portfolio choice is nontrivial because her own belief on the F ’s foreign asset
holdings would critically affect the objective function, JH(âh, â∗h) as in Lemma 3. Thus, one
ought to build on Lemma 3 in order to study the optimal behavior of H in details. Lemma 6
summarizes the results.
Lemma 6. A home agent’s optimal choice of home asset holdings is simple, and satisfies the following.
If ψ = β then, the optimal home asset holdings of H should be greater than or equal to aˇ. On the other
hand, if ψ > β then, there exists an unique level of home asset holdings, a˜ such that a˜ ∈ (0, aˇ) and
ψ − β = σβ {u′(q(a˜))− 1} .
Taking ψ∗ given, the H’s optimal choice of foreign asset holdings (a˜∗h) can be categorized into three
different regimes depending on her beliefs on the F ’s foreign asset holdings.
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Belief 1: â∗f > aˇ
If ψ∗ = β then, a˜∗h = R++ ≥ c(κ˜)/β.
If ψ∗ > β then, a˜∗h = c(κ)/β such that ψ
∗ − β = χhβ {u′(κ)/c′(κ)− 1}.
Belief 2: a¯∗f < â
∗
f ≤ aˇ
If ψ∗ = β then, a˜∗h = R++ ≥ f
(
â∗f , κ˜
)
.
If β < ψ∗ ≤ ψ∗ then, a˜∗h = f
(
â∗f , κ
)
such that ψ∗ − β = χhβ {u′(κ)/c′(κ)− 1}.
If ψ∗ < ψ∗ then, a˜∗h = f
(
â∗f , κ
)
such that ψ∗ − β = χhβ
{
u′(κ)/c′(κ)
{
(1− σ) + σu′(βâ∗f )
}− 1}.
Belief 3: â∗f ≤ a¯∗f
If ψ∗ = β then, a˜∗h = R++ ≥ f
(
â∗f , κ˜
)
.
If ψ∗ > β then, a˜∗h = f
(
â∗f , κ
)
such that ψ∗ − β = χhβ
{
u′(κ)/c′(κ)
{
(1− σ) + σu′(βâ∗f )
}− 1},
where ψ∗ is such that ψ∗−β = χhβ {u′(κ)/c′(κ)− 1} and c(κ) = σ [u(q˜)− q˜]−σ
[
u(q(â∗f ))− q(â∗f )
]
+
β(aˇ− â∗f ).
Proof. See appendix
Technical details of the H’s optimization problem are relegated to appendix. In what fol-
lows, we provide intuitive interpretation of important properties of the H’s optimal portfolio
choice. First of all, her optimal home asset demand is trivial because she would only take the
local DM’s bargaining protocol into consideration. As a matter of fact, it is identical to the F ’s
optimal foreign asset holdings since both H and F face a symmetric market structure in their
own local DMs, i.e., same degree of search frictions prevail, and only local assets are used as
media of exchange.
However, H’s optimal choice for foreign asset holdings would be nontrivial. Suppose the
foreign asset price is at the fundamental level (ψ∗ = β) for instance. Since the cost of carrying
foreign assets becomes zero, it would not be optimal for H to be in a region where her assets
would not allow her to afford the optimal quantity of κ. In short, if ψ∗ = β then, H would never
choose a portfolio in the interior of regions 2, 4 or 6 of Figure 3.
In contrast, if ψ∗ > β, carrying the asset becomes costly. The optimal choice of H is then
pinned down by the first-order conditions and, graphically, it lies within regions of either 2, 4
or 6 depending on her beliefs upon a∗f . For instance, suppose H’s belief on the F ’s foreign asset
holdings happens to be greater than the first best liquidity amount (aˇ). In this case, Lemma 3
confirms that the FOC associated with the region 2 always pins down the H’s optimal choice of
foreign asset holdings.
Interesting case happens when H believes that â∗f lies in between a¯
∗
f and aˇ. In this scenario,
the relative size of the foreign asset price becomes crucial. When ψ∗ is too high, i.e., ψ∗ > ψ∗,
the cost of carrying asset becomes too burdensome for H . Thus, she would typically choose to
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hold less foreign assets and settle in the interior of region 6. Then, the associated FOC deter-
mines the optimal level of foreign asset holdings. On the other hand, if the ψ∗ stays in a rather
moderate range, i.e., β < ψ∗ < ψ∗, then, she would increase her foreign asset holdings so that
her marginal benefit falls and equalizes to a new and diminished level of marginal cost, i.e., she
would end up within the region 4.
To graphically sum up intuition, the foreign asset demand by H , D∗h is plotted in Figure 4
against the price, ψ∗.19 In this graph, H’s belief on the level of F ’s foreign asset holdings is kept
fixed at the values (â∗f )
1, (â∗f )
2 and (â∗f )
3. These values are indicated in the lower panel of Figure
4, which replicates Figure 3. The vertical alignment of the two plots enables one to find which
regions in terms of Figure 3 H finds herself in, for any choice of â∗h, given the value of (â
∗
f )
j ,
j = 1, 2 and 3. In essence, the greater F ’s foreign asset holdings are the more H demands the
asset, i.e., (D∗h)
1 > (D∗h)
2 > (D∗h)
3. This is because of the fact that F who holds more foreign as-
sets becomes less desperate during the FIM trade. Thus, H would have to give up more foreign
assets to induce F to accept the offer in the FIM bargaining.
Another important feature of the graph is the kinked demand curve for the moderate range
of â∗f , i.e., (a
∗
f )
2. (D∗h)
2 exhibits a kink at a threshold level of ψ∗. To illustrate this property, one
needs to recall the regime switch between region 4 and 6 in the neighborhood of ψ∗ in the previ-
ous paragraph. Imagine a case where the foreign asset price steadily rises from its fundamental
value β. Once the ψ∗ pushes H from the region 4 into 6, she would deal with more desperate
F during the FIM bargaining. This would in turn make her less sensitive to the change in the
foreign asset prices compared to the case in the region 4. Another way of putting it is that F ’s
willingness to provide more κ in exchange for the same amount of foreign assets would some-
what offset the effects of change in the cost of carrying assets. In short, H’s elasticity of asset
demand with respect to ψ∗ should be lower in the region 6 than 4, consistent with the direction
of a kink in (D∗h)
2.
5 Equilibrium
5.1 Definition and Existence of Equilibrium
Having established the optimal behavior of the representative agent, the next step is to discuss
a recursive equilibrium of the economy. This paper only focuses on the steady state equilib-
rium and study the equilibrium property associated with effects of different degrees of search
frictions in the FIM on equilibrium asset prices and portfolio composition. First, a steady state
equilibrium in this model is defined as follows.
19 a∗h,r in Figure 4 is defined as follows. a
∗
h,r =
{
a∗h : c(κ˜) = σ
[
u(q(a∗f + a
∗
h))− u(q(a∗f ))
]
+ (1− σ)βa∗h
}
.
18
Definition 1. For the two-country economy, a steady state equilibrium is a following list of an alloca-
tion {Xi, Li, ah, a∗i , i = {h, f}}, together with value functions {V i,Ωi,W i, i = {H,F}}, a set of prices
{ψ, ψ∗}, bilateral terms of trade {κ(a∗h, a∗f ), b∗(a∗h, a∗f )} in the FIM, bilateral terms of trade {q(ah), n(ah)}
in theH’s local DM, bilateral terms of trade
{
q(a∗f ), n(a
∗
f )
}
in the F ’s local DM when F was not matched
in the preceding FIM, and bilateral terms of trade
{
q(a∗f + b
∗(a∗h, a
∗
f )), n(a
∗
f + b
∗(a∗h, a
∗
f ))
}
in the F ’s lo-
cal DM when F was matched in the preceding FIM such that
X Given prices, the value functions and decision rules satisfy e.q (1), (3), (5), (6) (7), and (8)
X Bargaining solutions in the FIM and DMs satisfy Lemma 1 and 2
X The set of prices is such that all agents maximize their objective functions, e.q (11) and (13)
X Markets for the two assets clear and expectations are rational, i.e., ah = T and a∗h + a∗f = T ∗.
The definition of equilibrium is straightforward. Notice that the equilibrium quantity of
(local) special goods produced in the F ’s local DM depends on whether the F was matched in
the preceding FIM or not. For instance, a foreign agent who did not get matched in the FIM
can not purchase the first best amount of special goods, i.e., q˜ in her local DM unless she had
brought more than aˇ from the preceding CM. However, if she was matched in the FIM then,
she would be, on some occasions, able to achieve the q˜ even if her ex-ante foreign asset holdings
were less than aˇ (for example, when (a∗h, a
∗
f ) lies within the region 3 or 4). Obviously, on some
other occasions when either her foreign asset holdings fall short of aˇ to a great extent, e.g., the
region 5, or H’s foreign asset holdings are too small, e.g., the region 6, she would not be able to
obtain the aˇ even with the FIM matching. Next, the following lemma guarantees existence of
equilibrium and states the conditions under which the equilibrium is unique.
Lemma 7. If T ∗ < aˇ + c(κ˜)/β then, a unique list of steady state equilibrium objects defined in the
Definition 1 exists. Otherwise, ψ = ψ∗ = β, and an indeterminacy arises in the portfolio choice of
(a∗h, a
∗
f ).20
Proof. See appendix
Lemma 7 can be explained intuitively with Figure 3. If T ∗ ≥ aˇ + c(κ˜)/β, then the Figure 3
admits that equilibrium portfolio of (a∗h, a
∗
f ) ought to lie within the region of 1, 2, 3, or 5. Sup-
pose it lies in the interior of region 2. Here, F owns the first best amount of liquidity for her
DM trade and therefore, she would not pay anything more than the fundamental value of the
foreign asset, β. Yet, H would still like to pay liquidity premium on that asset to get closer to
20 The irrelevance of T , the home asset supply, for the uniqueness of the equilibrium is obvious. Intuitively, only
home agents purchase home assets, and the T does not affect the FIM bargaining protocol at all.
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the κ˜. This would cause a violation of no arbitrage condition for the foreign asset trade and
therefore, no equilibrium portfolio can be achieved in this region.
Similar reasoning applies to the region 3 and 5. In these regions, F lacks liquidity in refer-
ence to the first best choice (aˇ) and therefore, must be willing to pay liquidity premium on the
foreign asset. H , on the other hand, would not value the asset more than its fundamental value
since she always accomplishes at least κ˜ in this region. Again, no equilibrium would exist in
these regions.
Lastly, if the equilibrium portfolio, (a∗h, a
∗
f ) stayed in the region 1, every agents would achieve
the first best amount of liquidity for both of the FIM and DM. Hence, the price should settle at
the fundamental value, β and any combination of (a∗h, a
∗
f ) should satisfy the optimality. This
eventually gives rise to a multiple equilibrium of the economy.
When T ∗ < aˇ + c(κ˜)/β, it is understood from Figure 3 that the equilibrium portfolio of
(a∗h, a
∗
f ) could potentially lie anywhere except within the region 1. For the same reason de-
scribed earlier, the region 2, 3, and 5 are easily ruled out, which leaves only the region 4 and 6
as an equilibrium region. As witnessed again from the Figure 3, neither H nor F would find
herself in the plentiful liquidity situation within the region 4 and 6. H would always want more
foreign assets to aim for κ˜. Similarly F ex-ante would like to purchase foreign assets more as
well.21 This opens up the possibility of a unique market clearing price ψ∗, which can be indeed
pinned down by the first-order conditions for both H and F . The uniqueness of this price is
simply associated with the well-behaved, i.e. strictly concave, utility functions of agents. Tech-
nical details are left in the appendix. Finally owing to this unique price level of ψ∗ given T ∗, the
rest of equilibrium objects must be unique as well. To assist the intuition graphically, Figure 5
also plots the aggregate regions of (a∗h, a
∗
f ) in equilibrium. For notational convenience, these re-
gions are henceforth referred to as “aggregate regions” as opposed to the “individual regions”
described in Figure 3.
5.2 Characterization of the Equilibrium
Given the existence of the equilibrium, the next task is to assess to what extent structural pa-
rameters of this economy, T ∗ and χh, affect the various steady state equilibrium objects. Lemma
7 confirms a unique equilibrium under T ∗ < aˇ + c(κ˜)/β. This allows us to perform a compar-
ative static analysis. Focusing on the unique equilibrium case, the Proposition 1 evaluates the
effects of changes in T ∗ and χh on equilibrium prices and the equilibrium portfolio of (a∗h, a
∗
f ).
21 Ex-ante here means ‘before the FIM trade’. The fact that foreign agents would be able to make up for the first
best liquidity ex-post. i.e., after the FIM trade, does not attenuate F ’s appreciation for the foreign asset’s liquidity
property. This is simply because F would have to suffer more labor disutility, required for the asset acquisition
during the FIM bargaining.
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Proposition 1. The effects of foreign asset supply changes on the equilibrium are complicated. In fact,
they critically depend upon the relative size of T ∗. For instance, If aˇ ≤ T ∗ < aˇ + c(κ˜)/β, then, we have
the following results: i) ψ∗ > ψ = β when T ∗ = T ; ii) ∂a∗f/∂T ∗ > 0, ∂a∗h/∂T ∗ > 0, and ∂κ/∂T ∗ > 0;
and iii) ∂ψ∗/∂T ∗ < 0. If on the other hand, T ∗ < aˇ, then, we have different results: i) ψ∗ > ψ > β
when T ∗ = T ; ii) ∂a∗f/∂T ∗ > 0 and ∂ψ∗/∂T ∗ < 0; and iii) The signs of ∂a∗h/∂T ∗ and ∂κ/∂T ∗ are
ambiguous. The effects of a decline in search frictions within the FIM trade are, however, independent
of T ∗ and straightforward as follows: i) ∂a∗h/∂χh > 0; ii) ∂a∗f/∂χh < 0; iii) ∂ψ∗/∂χh > 0; and iv)
∂κ/∂χh > 0.
Proof. See appendix
Proposition 1 reveals that the exogenous foreign asset supply drives the equilibrium in a
non-trivial way. If assets are plentiful, in the precise sense that aˇ ≤ T ∗ < aˇ + c(κ˜)/β, then,
the unique equilibrium must be reached within aggregate region 4, as shown in Figure 5. It is
already explained earlier why the foreign asset carries a liquidity premium in this region. Inter-
estingly, under T ∗ = T , the home asset does have a liquidity premium since H always acquires
q˜ in this equilibrium region. What is more important is the effect of a change in T ∗ on the equi-
librium composition of (a∗h, a
∗
f ). Given that both H and F would desire more liquidity in this
region, it is obvious that an increase in T ∗ would increase equilibrium a∗h and a
∗
f simultaneously.
This would, in turn, relieve the liquidity shortage for all agents, and therefore, the new equilib-
rium price (or liquidity premium) of the foreign asset should decline.22 Finally, the FIM trade
volume (κ) would increase in this case because otherwise the optimality for the home agent
would imply a decrease in ψ∗ which is a contradiction: recall that ψ∗−β = χhβ {u′(κ)/c′(κ)− 1}
in region 4 from Lemma 3.
The properties of equilibrium responses towards a shift in the foreign asset supply are richer
if the asset is relatively scarce, that is, if T ∗ < aˇ. In this scenario, the equilibrium must occur
within region 6 of Figure 5. First, if T ∗ = T , then, both the home and foreign assets carry the
liquidity premium. Yet, note that the foreign asset exhibits liquidity properties in the FIM and
the foreign country’s local DM simultaneously makes ψ∗ > ψ in equilibrium. Second, it is intu-
itive that an increase in T ∗ would for sure induce F to demand foreign assets more. As a result
of more foreign asset holdings by F , her optimality must require lower the costs of carrying the
foreign asset, and thus, lower ψ∗ in the new equilibrium.
The equilibrium response of a∗h and κ to an increase in T
∗ would, however, be inconclusive.
This ambiguity can be intuitively understood with the assistance of the liquidity dependent par-
ticipation constraint for F during the FIM trade. At first, the decline in ψ∗, that is the marginal
cost of carrying the foreign asset, would initially generate upward pressure for H’s foreign as-
set demand. However, as T ∗ rises, F ex-ante anticipates a greater amount of liquidity from FIM
22 A recent work by Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) also demonstrates that bond supply does
positively affect bond yields in the case of U.S. T-Bonds.
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trade. This would make F become less desperate for the foreign asset during FIM bargaining.
Eventually, less favorable FIM terms of trade would be expected by H , and the initial upward
pressure to hold more a∗h would be somewhat mitigated. Therefore, the signs of ∆a
∗
h and ∆κ
depend upon which of the two effects dominates, which in turn, is affected by the structural
parameters of the economy.23
The most novel results of this study, discussed in Proposition 1, concern the effects of global
financial integration on asset (bond) prices and the global portfolio composition. In essence, the
extent to which OTC international investment markets are accessible to foreign agents is sug-
gested as a key driving force behind the recent upsurge in emerging markets’ international
reserve holdings. The underlying intuition is straightforward. An increase in χh or a de-
crease in the search frictions in the FIM would first make the probability of matching in the
FIM increase. This would undoubtedly raise the marginal benefit from holding foreign assets
for home agents. Consequently, foreign asset holdings by the home country would rise, thus,
∂a∗h/∂χh > 0.
The increase in χh also yields a clear implication on the global portfolio composition. While
a∗h rises in response to an increase in χh, a
∗
f would instead decrease, that is ∂a
∗
f/∂χh < 0. This is
again attributed to foreign agents’ fixed identity as a seller in the FIM trade (they would never
use foreign assets as a medium of exchange for purchasing purpose during the FIM trade). As
a result, the global portfolio of (a∗h, a
∗
f ) would be increasingly biased towards a
∗
h as χh (a proxy
for the home country’s financial openness) increases.
A higher χh would increase the higher liquidity properties of foreign assets through two
channels. For one thing, the higher matching probability would surely make the liquidity value
of foreign assets in the FIM higher. Further, the decline in the amount of a∗f would cause foreign
agents to ex-ante appreciate the liquidity property of the asset in their local DM more. To put
it differently, since the higher χh effectively causes some of their foreign asset holdings to be
transferred to home agents during the CM, foreign agents would ex-ante fear the liquidity loss
within the subsequent local DM. In short, the higher χh gets, the higher agents appreciate the
liquidity property of foreign assets in both FIM and the foreign country’s local DM. This would
eventually reduce (raise) the foreign asset’s yield (price) at the new equilibrium: ∂ψ∗/∂χh > 0.
Finally, easier access to the OTC international investment markets also has a straightfor-
ward implication for the FIM trade volume. The increase in χh raises the FIM trade volume (κ)
through the extensive margin (more matches between H and F ). On top of that, the FIM trade
volume would also rise through the intensive margin (within each match a larger amount of
23 Nevertheless, it should be clear that the extent to which a∗h increases in response to a rise in T
∗, if true under
some parameter values, must be smaller in aggregate region 6 than in 4. Technical details can be found in the
appendix. Intuitively, this fact is attributed to the additional incentive change for F explained earlier. In fact, this
less degree of positive relationship between T ∗ and a∗h in aggregate 6 is a mirror image of the kinked foreign asset
demand curve, (D∗h)
2 in Figure 4. It illustrates how H’s demand exhibits lower price elasticity in region 6 than in
4. Since ψ∗ and T ∗ have a negative one-to-one relationship in equilibrium, the less responsiveness of a∗h to T
∗ in
aggregate region 6 is obvious.
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κ is produced, because the increase in χh induces home agents to carry more foreign assets).
Naturally, a positive relationship between κ and χh should prevail in equilibrium: ∂κ/∂χh > 0.
6 Predictions of the Model and Empirical Evidence
The goal of this section is to empirically show that our model’s predictions hold true with real
data. To this end, we investigate if Proposition 1 is supported in the data. The main prediction
of Proposition 1 is clear: an increase in financial openness, χh, enhances the liquidity properties
of foreign assets in the FIM trade. In consequence, the relative share of the T ∗ (international
reserves) by the home country rises, which in turn boosts the amount of foreign investment
inflows, especially through OTC markets. Hence, the level of foreign asset stocks held by the
home country and the OTC-channeled foreign investment inflows must be positively linked,
according to Proposition 1.
Note that apart from the main prediction above, Proposition 1 includes a richer set of com-
parative static analyses, especially regarding the effect of U.S. T-Bonds supply on bond prices
and asset portfolio choices. Although these predictions are worth testing, we chose to rule them
out for the following reasons. First, as mentioned in footnote 3, Krishnamurthy and Vissing-
Jorgensen (2012) already confirm that supply changes have large (negative) price effects on U.S.
T-Bonds, and attribute these effects to the superb liquidity properties of U.S. T-Bonds. With re-
gard to the relationship between the supply of U.S. T-Bonds and reserves hoarding, our model
prediction is ambiguous, and depends on the threshold of the treasury securities supply. An
empirical investigation for this threshold is non-trivial and certainly not within the scope of this
study. Lastly, in a panel set up, estimating the heterogeneous responses of reserve hoarding to
changes in U.S. T-Bonds supply would be greatly restricted because the latter is a common
shock to all emerging countries. Therefore, In what follows, we only focus on the relationship
between OTC foreign capital inflows and international reserves. We first introduce our estima-
tion strategies and then describe the data and how important variables are constructed. Our
empirical results follow in the last sub-section.
6.1 Empirical Specification
Throughout the empirical section of this paper, we estimate the following system of equations
simultaneously, in the spirit of Imbs (2004), Davis (2014), and Pyun and An (2014). For instance,
Imbs (2004) employs a simultaneous equation approach to identify the relationship among four
endogeneous variables—financial integration, trade integration, industrial specialization, and
business cycle comovement. In our empirical model, OTC inflows and Reserves/GDP are all
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determined endogenously. Thus, the simultaneous equations model that considers the endo-
geneity between key variables—OTC inflows and Reserves/GDP—makes it possible to disen-
tangle the simultaneous effects between two key variables, as well as to estimate the effects of
financial openness on the two variables. Our simultaneous equations model consists of two
equations:
OTCi,t = α0 + α1 ·R GDPi,t + α2 · FOi,t +X ′i,t · α3 + I ′1i,t · α4 + 1i,t, (14)
R GDPi,t = β0 + β1 ·OTCi,t + β2 · FOi,t +W ′i,t · β3 + I ′2i,t · β4 + 2i,t. (15)
Our two endogenous variables are R GDPi,t and OTCi,t. R GDPi,t is the ratio of official
international reserve to GDP, and OTCi,t is a measure for OTC foreign capital inflows to an
emerging country. FOi,t is a measure for financial openness which triggers shocks in the system.
Vectors X ′i,t and W ′i,t are other control variables that affect OTC inflows and reserves-to-GDP,
respectively. The vectors I ′1i,t and I ′2i,t are vectors of exogenous variables —country fixed effects,
year fixed effects, and banking and currency crisis dummies —that help describe the relation-
ship between R GDPi,t and OTCi,t. Hence, if the system is well identified, the simultaneous
equations model can be used to isolate the effects of financial openness on two endogenous
variables, implied by coefficients α2 and β2. Moreover, α1 and β1 should successfully affirm the
effects of OTC inflows on reserves-to-GDP, and vice versa, in a well-identified system.
6.2 Data
Since OTC foreign capital inflows are a new variable in the literature, no other benchmark vari-
ables exist. Furthermore, to the best of our knowledge, no aggregate data on these flows are
available for emerging economies. For this reason, we must rely on imputed measures from
International Financial Statistics (IFS). First, we exploit the stylized fact that most emerging
market debts are traded in OTC markets (see, for instance, Duffie, Gaˆrleanu, and Pedersen
(2005)). As such, IFS debt liability flows have been chosen as our basic proxy for OTC foreign
capital inflows.
In addition, FDI inflows into emerging countries have increasingly been in the form of M&A
(especially in financial FDI activities), a substantial portion of which is transacted outside a cen-
tralized clearing house system (e.g., a stock exchange). Therefore, we add FDI liabilities to debt
liabilities for our baseline measure of OTC foreign capital inflows. We readily admit that this
measure may suffer measurement errors, as the IFS does not offer segregated data on portfolio
debt or FDI in terms of trading characteristics. However, note that we partially reduce mea-
surement errors by controlling for country fixed effects.
To overcome any measurement errors of our baseline OTC measures, we also introduce ven-
ture capital inflows as a direct measure for OTC inflows. The rationale is straightforward. OTC
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transactions feature prominently in the venture capital (private equity) market, and there have
been rapid increases in the size of the venture capital industry over the past two decades (see
Silviera and Wright (2007), and references therein, for more information). In this market, there
are two typical players: entrepreneurs with viable ideas for projects, and venture capitalists
(private equity firms) who have expertise in evaluating and implementing those potentially
high-risk-high-return projects, as well as access to funds (private equity funds). Typically, ven-
ture capitalists exert a great deal of resources and time in searching for target firms or projects.
Once the two players match, they also bargain over terms of trade, another feature of OTC
trade (see, for instance, Kaplan and Stromberg (2001) and Silviera and Wright (2007) for a more
detailed explanation on the OTC aspects of venture capital investment).
Data for the venture capital inflows are collected from the FactSet database. The FactSet
database provides useful information on global equity ownership for about 13,000 institutions
and 33,000 funds. Many financial institutions, including mutual funds, pension funds, bank
trusts, and insurance companies, are required to frequently disclose their asset holdings to the
public. The FactSet is able to gather data on these asset holdings from various sources.24 A nice
feature of the FactSet database is that it provides information on the market value of institu-
tional holdings by institution type, institution domicile, and the final destination of the insti-
tutional investment.25 Here, we focus on a specific entity of investors, venture capital/private
equity. In particular, FactSet data classify private equity as institutions that invest almost exclu-
sively in private equity, and are most often venture capital firms. These institutions are looking
to reap large profits from companies through a merger or sale, an initial public offering, or a re-
capitalization, which carries more risk than a typical investment. We retrieve holdings of these
institutions classified as venture capital/private equity and aggregate them by host country.
Unbalanced panel information on venture capital investment (gross) inflows for 23 host coun-
tries during 1999-2011 is compiled. However, data coverage is limited (only 159 observations
are available).
With regard toX ′i,t andW ′i,t, we adopt variables widely accepted in the literature. Aizenman
and Lee (2007), Cheung and Ito (2009), and Obstfeld, Shambaugh, and Taylor (2010) specified
important determinants of international reserves. These regressors include defacto and dejure
financial openness from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007b), and Chinn and Ito (2008) respectively,
trade openness (import-to-GDP ratio), M2/GDP, exchange rate volatility (annual standard de-
24 For equities traded in the U.S., the FactSet collects institutional holdings from the mandatory quarterly 13F
filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) or by rolling up the holdings by individual mutual
funds (N-30D filings with the SEC) managed by a particular fund management company. For equities traded
outside the U.S., it collects ownership data directly from sources such as national regulatory agencies or stock
exchange announcements (e.g., the Regulatory News Service in the U.K.), local and offshore mutual funds, mutual
fund industry directories (e.g., European Fund Industry Directory), and company proxies and annual reports. See
Ferreira and Matos (2008) for more detailed information on the FactSet database.
25 FactSet classifies individual institutional entities into 27 broad institutional types—investment advisor, hedge
fund manager, venture captial/private equity, etc.
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viation of monthly exchange rate changes), (log) terms of trade, and peg and soft-peg dummies
from Shambaugh (2004); and currency and banking crisis dummies from Laeven and Valencia
(2012). We adopt all these variables for W ′i,t in our specification.
However, the determinants of OTC inflows are rarely examined empirically. X ′i,t, therefore,
includes sparse controls: (log) population as a measure for country size and (log) GDP per
capita as a proxy for a country’s quality of financial institutions. Data is collected from World
Development Indicators (WDI), the World Bank, International Financial Statistics (IFS), the IMF,
and updated and extended versions of Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007b)’s dataset. Observations
from 71 emerging and developing countries (including developed countries with substantial
reserve holdings) for the years 1990-2011 are arranged in an unbalanced panel dataset. The
sample countries are listed in Table 1. Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics.
6.3 Empirical Results
Table 3 presents the benchmark results from the system of equations (14) and (15), estimated us-
ing a three-stage-least-squares (3SLS) analysis. Table 3 contains only the main variables of our
interest, OTC inflows, Reserves/GDP, and financial openness. We isolate the effects of OTC
inflows on Reserves/GDP, and vice versa, using an exogenous financial openness variable. All
columns include country and year fixed effects, and crisis dummies as exogenous variables.
Column (1) reports the results for the first model, in which the financial openness measure is
included as an explanatory variable only for OTC inflows (debt liabilities + FDI liabilities). The
estimated coefficient of Reserves/GDP is significant and positive. The coefficient of financial
openness turns out to be significant and positive as well. The lower panel of column (1) shows
that the estimated coefficient of OTC inflows on Reserves/GDP is positive and significant at the
1% level. These three coefficients in column (1) confirm the theoretical prediction that a higher
degree of financial openness in the FIM would lead to a higher level of foreign asset holdings
by the home country.
In column (2), we instead include the exogenous financial openness variable only for the
reserves equation to account for simultaneous endogeneity. The estimated results in column (2)
are consistent with those in column (1), and reaffirm the positive relationship between OTC in-
flows and international reserves holdings. Columns (3) and (4) iterate the same specifications in
columns (1) and (2) with the alternative OTC measure, that is, venture capital inflows provided
by FactSet database. Owing to limited data, the number of observations shrinks from 1519 to
160, but the results support our main message: The estimated coefficients on the OTC inflows
and Reserves/GDP are positive and significant in columns (3) and (4) respectively. Note that
the estimated coefficient of financial openness on venture capital in column (3) is positive but
statistically insignificant. These benchmark results strongly support for Proposition 1. How-
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ever, these results might be biased because we do not fully consider other controls that affect
OTC inflows and reserves holdings in the system.
Table 4 shows the main results of this study. Here, other important controls for OTC inflows
and Reserves/GDP are included to check the robustness of the results in Table 3. The results in
Table 4 are consistent with those in Table 3. In columns (1)-(3), we include various variables of
exogenous shocks, financial openness in both OTC inflows and reserves equations (column (1)),
and each equation (columns (2) and (3)). The upper and lower panels in column (1) show the re-
sults of the simultaneous regression equation for OTC inflows and Reserves/GDP, respectively.
The estimated coefficients on Reserves/GDP and OTC inflows are positive and significant at the
1% level. The coefficients on financial openness are positive in both panels although only the
one in OTC inflows equation is statistically significant. In columns (2) and (3), we control for
financial openness only in either of the two equations. Not only is the positive relationship
between OTC inflows and Reserves/GDP preserved but financial openness also has a positive
impact on the two endogenous variables. Throughout columns (1)-(3), other explanatory vari-
ables have the expected signs for Reserves/GDP. For instance, (log) population, M2/GDP, and
trade openness have significant and positive impacts on reserves holdings, consistent with pre-
vious findings.
For the robustness of the results, we implement our main simultaneous equations regres-
sions with alternative measures for OTC inflows and financial openness. Table 5 employs the
dejure financial openness measure instead of the defacto financial openness measure in our
baseline regressions. Tables 6 and 7 introduce alternative measures for OTC inflows. Table 6
uses venture capital inflows. Table 7 considers debt liabilities only as a proxy for OTC inflows.
All the results in Tables 5, 6, and 7 support the model’s prediction consistently: the estimated
coefficients on OTC inflows and Reserves/GDP in the system of equations are positive and
statistically significant at the 1% level. Additionally, on the whole, financial openness shows a
positive sign for the two key endogenous variables. Note that while the estimated coefficient
of financial openness on Reserves/GDP in column (1) of Table 6 is positive, the coefficient of
financial openness on venture capital is negative and marginally significant, which is counter
to the model’s prediction. However, when excluding the financial openness measure from the
reserves equation, the financial openness coefficient in column (3) becomes statistically insignif-
icant. This negative and insignificant inference on financial openness may be caused by the
small number of observations for venture capital inflows.
7 Concluding Remarks
Markets through which developing countries acquire foreign capital have been increasingly
characterized by OTC features. We argue that this trend is a key to understanding emerging
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economies’ extraordinary reserve accumulation over the last decade. Since these decentralized
markets lack perfect credit and commitment, a facilitator of trade, that is, a liquid asset, is re-
quired. Typically, U.S. T-Bonds have served this role, either through collateral or buffer stocks
against the repatriation of foreign capital. Declining financial frictions in these markets thus
enhance the assets’ liquidity property, which induces developing counties in need of sustained
foreign investment to acquire U.S. T-Bonds relatively more. As a result, the amount of emerg-
ing economies’ U.S. T-Bonds holdings would rise in equilibrium. Furthermore, the sustained
increase in the U.S. T-Bonds’ liquidity attribute leads to a higher liquidity premium on these
assets, thereby causing low real U.S. interest rates. Indeed, our simultaneous equations estima-
tion approach, controlling for the endogenous relationship between OTC inflows and reserves
holdings lends quite strong support for this liquidity-based story.
One may doubt our liquidity mechanism, given that OTC inflows still take a fraction of total
foreign capital inflows into emerging markets in practice. Nonetheless, we do not necessarily
think of this as a major caveat to our theory. The reason is that liquidity or collateral benefits of
international reserves do not need to be confined to OTC international capital markets. As La-
gos (2010, 2011) points out, risk premiums on equity and liquidity premiums on U.S. T-Bonds
might as well have a two-way interaction effect to the extent that assets serve as a source of
liquidity. Therefore, one could introduce aggregate equity shocks to our framework and show
how liquidity benefits of reserves could easily translate from OTC international capital markets
to, for instance, emerging equity markets. In fact, a recent study by Qian and Steiner (2014)
indeed confirm the aggregate collateral benefits of reserves even within centralized foreign eq-
uity investment markets.
Last but not least, the aim of our argument for an alternative understanding of the accumu-
lation of reserves is not to refute existing explanations. Instead, one should view this paper’s
alternative explanation as complementary to existing ones. We intend for our liquidity based
DGE framework to enrich the dimension of research in this field. This framework can be ex-
tended to further study interesting research questions. What social welfare effects does reserve
accumulation generates in light of the increasing portion of OTC international capital transac-
tions? Is there an optimal degree of decentralization in international capital markets? How
does reserve hoarding affect that optimal degree and vice versa?
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A Theory Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2.
The participation constraint for the F during this bargaining also depends on how much foreign
assets in reference to the first best in the subsequent DM (aˇ) that F has brought up. We consider
three possible scenarios regarding the amount of F ’s foreign asset holdings.
Scenario 1: a∗f ≥ aˇ
In this scenario, the bargaining problem simplifies to
max
{κ,b∗}
{u(κ)− βb∗} ,
s.t. c(κ) ≤ βb∗,
with b∗ ≤ a∗h. Solution for this problem is standard and straightforward. If a∗h ≥ c(κ˜)/β then,
κ = κ˜ and b∗ = c(κ˜)/β. If instead a∗h ≤ c(κ˜)/β then, κ = {κ : βa∗h = c(κ)} and b∗ = a∗h. So given
the assumption of a∗f ≥ aˇ, the above two solutions correspond to the region 1 and 2.
Scenario 2: aˇ− b∗ ≤ a∗f ≤ aˇ
In this scenario, the F would get the first best liquidity amount for the subsequent DM (aˇ) only
after the bargaining. Hence, the bargaining problem is described by
max
{κ,b∗}
{u(κ)− βb∗} ,
s.t. c(κ) ≤ βb∗ + σ [u(q˜)− q˜]− σ [u(q(a∗f ))− βn(a∗f )] ,
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with b∗ ≤ a∗h. First order conditions for this problem follows as:
κ : u′(κ) = λ1c′(κ), (a.1)
b∗ : −β + λ1β − λ2 = 0, (a.2)
where λ1 and λ2 are the associated lagrange multipliers for the above two constraints. Let us
consider two possible cases.
When λ2 = 0
If we let λ2 = 0 then b∗ < a∗h must hold. Since a
∗
f + b
∗ ≥ aˇ by assumption in this scenario,
the e.q.(a.1) ensures λ1 = 1 ⇒ κ = κ˜. Moreover, the participation constraint also binds due to
λ1 = 1. Hence,
c(κ˜) = βb∗ + σ [u(q˜)− q˜]− σ [u(q(a∗f ))− βn(a∗f )] . (a.3)
It is understood that the maximum value of b∗ must equal to c(κ˜)/β since e.q.(a.3) implies b∗ ∝
a∗f and max{a∗f} = aˇ by the assumption. We also need to make sure that these solutions satisfy
conditions imposed in this scenario. First, in order to ensure b∗ < a∗b implied by λ2 = 0, one
needs the following condition based on e.q.(a.3).
c(κ˜)− σ [u(q˜)− q˜] + σ [u(q(a∗f ))− βn(a∗f )] < βa∗h. (a.4)
On top of that, one would also need to verify b∗ ≥ aˇ− a∗f imposed by the scenario 2 assumption
which leads to
c(κ˜)− σ [u(q˜)− q˜] + σ [u(q(a∗f ))− βn(a∗f )] ≥ β(aˇ− a∗f ). (a.5)
Equations (a.4) and (a.5) hold if a∗h + a
∗
f > aˇ which therefore needs to be imposed. Next, a
∗
f
must be bounded from below due to the following reason. Combining the e.q.(a.4) and (a.5)
generates
σ
[
u(βa∗f )− βa∗f
]
+ βa∗f ≥ βaˇ+ σ [u(qˇ)− qˇ]− c(κ˜). (a.6)
This e.q.(a.6) confirms that ∃a¯∗f such that
σ
[
u(βa∗f )− βa∗f
]
+ βa∗f = βaˇ+ σ [u(qˇ)− qˇ]− c(κ˜). (a.7)
Note here the condition a∗h + a
∗
f > aˇ imposed above is redundant as long as e.q.(a.4) holds and
a∗f > a¯
∗
f since the LHS of inequality e.q.(a.4) is increasing in a
∗
f while aˇ − a∗f falls with a∗f . It is
also important to notice that the relative size of cost of producing capital goods during the FIM
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critically determines the sign of a¯∗f . If c(κ˜) turns out to be greater than βaˇ+σ [u(qˇ)− qˇ] then it is
obvious that a¯∗f must be a negative value otherwise a¯
∗
f becomes positive. Hence, the bargaining
solution depends on the set of parameter space for c(κ˜), u(q˜), and aˇ. For now, let us restrict
ourselves to the case, c(κ˜) < βaˇ + σ
[
u(q˜) − q˜] and consider the other case later. To sum up, for
the solution to be κ = κ˜ and b∗ < a∗h such that e.q.(a.3) holds
1. a¯∗f ≤ a∗f ≤ aˇ,
2. a∗h ≥
{
c(κ˜)− σ [u(q˜)− u(βa∗f ) + q˜ − βa∗f]} /β.
which corresponds to the region 3 solution.
When λ2 > 0
If we let λ2 > 0 then, b∗ = a∗h must hold. Since a
∗
f + b
∗ ≥ aˇ by assumption in this scenario,
a∗f + a
∗
h ≥ aˇ and the e.q.(a.1) ensures λ1 > 1 ⇒ κ < κ˜. Moreover, the participation constraint
also binds due to λ1 > 1. Hence the solution for κ must satisfy
c(κ) = βa∗h + σ [u(q˜)− q˜]− σ
[
u(q(a∗f ))− q(a∗f )
]
, (a.8)
c(κ˜) > βa∗h + σ [u(q˜)− q˜]− σ
[
u(q(a∗f ))− q(a∗f )
]
,
a∗h ≤
c(κ˜)− σ [u(q˜)− u(βa∗f ) + q˜ − βa∗f]
β
.
Furthermore, combining e.q.(a.8) with a∗h ≥ aˇ− a∗f yields
c(κ)− σ [u(q˜)− q˜] + σ [u(q(a∗f ))− q(a∗f )] ≥ β(aˇ− a∗f ) (a.9)
σ
[
u(βa∗f )− βa∗f
]
+ βa∗f ≥ βaˇ+ σ [u(qˇ)− qˇ]− c(κ).
From e.q.(a.7) and (a.9), it is understood that a∗f > a¯
∗
f in this case 2 as well. Thus for the solution
to be b∗ = a∗h and κ < κ˜ such that e.q.(a.8) holds
1. a¯∗f ≤ a∗f ≤ aˇ,
2. a∗h + a
∗
f ≥ aˇ,
3. a∗h ≤
{
c(κ˜)− σ [u(q˜)− u(βa∗f ) + q˜ − βa∗f]} /β,
which corresponds to the region 4.
Scenario 3: a∗f + b
∗ ≤ aˇ
In this scenario, the F would never get the first best liquidity amount for the subsequent DM,
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i.e., aˇ, even after the bargaining. Hence, the bargaining problem is described by
max
{κ,b∗}
{u(κ)− βb∗} ,
s.t. c(κ) ≤ βb∗ + σ [u(q(a∗f + b∗))− βn(a∗f + b∗)]− σ [u(q(a∗f ))− βn(a∗f )] ,
with b∗ ≤ a∗h. First order conditions for this problem follows as:
κ :u′(κ) = λ1c′(κ), (a.10)
b∗ :− β + λ1
[
β + σu′(q(a∗f + b
∗))β − σβ]− λ2 = 0, (a.11)
where λ1 and λ2 are associated Lagrange multipliers for the above two constraints. Let us
consider two possible cases.
When λ2 = 0
If we let λ2 = 0 then, the second constraint becomes slack, i.e., b∗ < a∗h. Also from e.q.(a.11) it is
obvious that λ1 < 1 ⇒ κ > κ˜. Again the first constraint binds due to positive value of λ1 and
therefore, the following must hold
c(κ) = βb∗ + σ
[
u(q(a∗f + b
∗))− βn(a∗f + b∗)
]− σ [u(q(a∗f ))− βn(a∗f )] > c(κ˜). (a.12)
As before, we again need to make sure that these solutions satisfy conditions imposed in this
scenario. First, in order to ensure b∗ < a∗h stemming from λ2 = 0, one needs the following
condition based on e.q.(a.12)
c(κ)− σ [u(q(a∗f + b∗))− βn(a∗f + b∗)]+ σ [u(q(a∗f ))− βn(a∗f )] < βa∗h (a.13)
c(κ)− σ [u(q(a∗f + b∗))− u(q(a∗f ))]+ σβb∗ < βa∗h.
On top of that, one would also need to verify b∗ ≤ aˇ− a∗f imposed by the scenario 3 assumption
which gives out
c(κ)− σ [u(q(a∗f + b∗))− βn(a∗f + b∗)]+ σ [u(q(a∗f ))− βn(a∗f )] < β(aˇ− a∗f ) (a.14)
σu(βa∗f ) + (1− σ)βa∗f < βaˇ+ σ
[
u(q(a∗f + b
∗))− q(a∗f + b∗)
]− c(κ). (a.15)
Now the question is whether a∗h + a
∗
f < aˇ or not. From e.q.(a.12), it is easy to see that
σu(q(a∗f )) = (1− σ)βb∗ + σu(q(a∗f + b∗))− c(κ), (a.16)
which confirms that {b∗, κ} is not uniquely determined, and yet positively related (b∗ ∝ κ). This
in turn ensures that a∗h must be bounded from below for the following reason. Due to b
∗ ∝ κ,
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c(κ) > c(κ˜) and e.q.(a.16), minimum value for b∗, b∗m is such that
c(κ˜) = σ
[
u(q(a∗f + b
∗
m))− u(q(a∗f ))
]
+ (1− σ)βb∗m. (a.17)
By the implicit function theorem, e.q.(a.17) confirms ∂b∗m/∂a∗f > 0
∂b∗m
∂a∗f
= −
∂G
∂a∗f
→ 	
∂G
∂b∗m
→ ⊕ > 0,
where G(b∗m, a∗f ) = σ
[
u(q(a∗f + b
∗
m))− u(q(a∗f ))
]
+ (1− σ)βb∗m − c(κ˜) and
∂G
∂a∗f
= σβ
[
u′(q(a∗f + b
∗
m))− u′(q(a∗f ))
]
< 0 due to the concavity assumption of u(·),
∂G
∂b∗m
= σβ
[
u′(q(a∗f + b
∗
m))− 1
]
+ βb∗ > 0 due to a∗f + b
∗ < aˇ.
Thus min{a∗h} (a∗h,Min) must be an increasing function of a∗f . In addition, when a∗f = 0 the a∗h,Min
must satisfy the following
c(κ˜) = σu(q(a∗h,Min)) + (1− σ)βa∗h,Min. (a.18)
Since we earlier restricted the parameter space into Case 1 such that c(κ˜) < σ
[
u(q˜)− q˜]+βaˇ, one
can easily verify that a∗h,Min < aˇ. Lastly we need to verify that when a
∗
f = a¯
∗
f , a
∗
h,Min is such that
a∗h,Min + a
∗
f = aˇ so that the feasible domain for a
∗
f in this scenario must be bounded from above,
i.e., a¯∗f . This can be done easily by comparing e.q.(a.17) and (a.3). Considering the knife-edge
case between region 3 and this region, e.q.(a.3) and (a.17) respectively gives out
c(κ˜)− σu(q˜) + σu(βa¯∗f ) + σβa∗h = βa∗h, (a.19)
c(κ˜)− σu(q(a¯∗f + b∗m)) + σu(βa¯∗f ) + σβb∗m = βb∗m. (a.20)
These two equations become identical when b∗m = a∗h and therefore, a
∗
h,Min + a
∗
f = aˇ must
hold at this knife-edge case of a∗f = a¯
∗
f . To sum up, for the indeterminate combination of
(κ, b∗) =
{
(κ, b∗) : κ > κ˜, b∗ < a∗h, b
∗ < aˇ− a∗f , c(κ) = (1− σ)βb∗ + σ
[
u(β(a∗f + b
∗)− u(βa∗f )
]}
to
be the solution, the following restrictions on a∗h and a
∗
f must hold true
1. a∗h ≥ a∗h,Min,
2. a∗f ≤ a¯∗f ,
which corresponds to region 5.
When λ2 > 0
36
If we let λ2 > 0 then, b∗ = a∗h must hold. Moreover, the participation constraint also binds due
to λ1 > 0. Hence the solution for κ must satisfy
c(κ) = (1− σ)βa∗h + σ
[
u(q(a∗f + a
∗
h))− u(q(a∗f ))
]
. (a.21)
Now the question is whether κ here is bigger or less than κ˜. As a matter of fact, it can be easily
shown that c(κ) < c(κ˜) in this case. First, the comparison between e.q.(a.21) and (a.17) confirm
that c(κ) ≤ c(κ˜) if a∗f ≤ a¯∗f . Second, if a∗f ≥ a¯∗f and a∗f +a∗h < aˇ then e.q.(a.21) tells us that the max
of c(κ) (c(κmax)) occurs at the point where a∗f = a¯
∗
f and a
∗
h = aˇ − a¯∗f due to again the concavity
assumption on u(·). Thus plugging a∗f = a¯∗f and a∗h = aˇ − a¯∗f into e.q.(a.21) would yield the
condition for c(κmax) as
c(κmax) = (1− σ)β(aˇ− a¯∗f ) + σ
[
u(q˜)− u(q(a¯∗f ))
]
(a.22)
= (1− σ)βa∗h + σ
[
u(a˜)− u(q(a¯∗f ))
]
,
which is same as e.q.(a.19). This completes the proof that c(κ) regardless of a∗f domain becomes
bounded from above, c(κ˜) in this case. To sum up, for the b∗ = a∗h and κ such that e.q.(a.21)
holds to be the solution, the following condition should be met
1. a∗h ≤ a∗h,Min,
2. a∗f ≤ aˇ− a∗h.
which corresponds to region 6.
Lastly, let us consider the parameter space such that βaˇ + σ
[
u(q˜) − q˜] ≤ c(κ˜). In this case, a¯∗f
becomes negative. This essentially eliminates the indeterminate solution region 5. The reason
for this disappearance is quite intuitive. Recall the participation constraint for the F in the
FIM bargaining problem. The F ’s liquidity evaluation of foreign assets, i.e., σu(q(a∗f + b
∗)) −
σβn(a∗f + b
∗) − σ [u(q(a∗f ))− βn(a∗f )], even when the her initial foreign asset holdings are zero
should reach an upper bound. Once the disutility of producing κ˜, i.e., c(κ˜), exceeds this bound-
ary, the F would never be willing to produce more than κ˜ and the terms of trade would never
settle at the point where κ > κ˜ even if a∗f falls into zero as shown in Figure 6. All the other con-
ditions regarding the remaining regions stay same. The following summarizes and graphically
illustrates the bargaining solution under this new parameter space.
If
a∗h ≥
c(κ˜)
β
a∗f ≥ aˇ
then
κ = κ˜b∗ = c(κ˜)
β
⇒ Region 1,
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If
a∗h ≤
c(κ˜)
β
a∗f ≥ aˇ
then
κ = {κ : βa∗h = c(κ)}b∗ = a∗h ⇒ Region 2,
If
a∗h ≥
c(κ˜)−σ[u(q˜)−u(βa∗f )+q˜−βa∗f ]
β
a∗f ≤ aˇ
then
κ = κ˜b∗ = c(κ˜)−σ[u(q˜)−u(βa∗f )+q˜−βa∗f ]
β
⇒ Region 3,
If
a∗h ≤
c(κ˜)−σ[u(q˜)−u(βa∗f )+q˜−βa∗f ]
β
aˇ− a∗h ≤ a∗f ≤ aˇ
then

κ =
{
κ : c(κ) = βa∗h
+σ
[
u(q˜)− u(βa∗f )− q˜ + βa∗f
]}
b∗ = a∗h
⇒ Region 4,
If a∗f + a
∗
h ≤ aˇ then

κ =
{
κ : c(κ) = βa∗h + σ
[
u(β(a∗f + a
∗
h))− u(βa∗f )
]
−σ[β(a∗f + a∗h)− βa∗f]}
b∗ = a∗h
⇒ Region 6.
This completes the proof. Q.E.D
Proof of Lemma 3.
From the Case 1 in Lemma 3, it is easy to check that the terms of trade in the FIM in regions
1,3, and 5 have nothing to do with â∗h. Thus the third line e.q.(11) basically becomes a constant
term. This makes the first derivative of JH with respect to â∗h simply equal to −ψ∗ + β. On
the contrary, the H would experience the liquidity shortage in region 2,4, and 6. Therefore she
would have to give up all of her foreign asset holdings during the FIM bargaining. This would
in turn cause κ to depend on â∗h as well. Thus the partial derivatives in these regions should
take a form as
∂JHi (âh, â
∗
h)
∂â∗h
= −ψ∗ + β + χhβ
{
u′(κ(·))∂κ(·)
∂â∗h
− β∂b
∗(·)
∂â∗h
}
i = 2, 4, 6,
∂b∗(·)/∂â∗h = 1 since b∗ = a∗h for all regions of 2,4, and 6. Applying the Implicit Function
Theorem to the FIM bargaining protocol described in Case 1 of Lemma 3 indicates
∂κ(·)
∂â∗h
=
−
−β
c′(κ) if i = 2, 4,
−−β−σu
′(β(a∗f+a
∗
h))β+σβ
c′(κ) if i = 6.
This completes the proof. Q.E.D
Proof of Lemma 4.
The budget constraint of the centralized market implies that the H can exploit more labor units
in period t by dLht and get either ψt+1dBht+1 units of home bonds or ψ∗t+1dRht+1 units of foreign
reserves. In the next period the H can therefore decrease the amount labor units exploited by
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dLht+1 = dB
h
t+1 or dRht+1. The net utility gain of doing this strategy is
dUht = −dLht + βdLht+1 =− dBht+1 [ψt+1 − β]
=− dRht+1
[
ψ∗t+1 − β
]
.
So, either of β > ψt+1 or β > ψ∗t+1 implies that dUt > 0 which would in turn cause for infinite
labor demand every period. Therefore in any any equilibrium β ≤ ψ and β ≤ ψ∗. This can
be applied to the F exactly in the same way. By the similar budget constraint of the F in the
centralized market, F can also exploit more labor units in period t by dLft and get dR
f
t+1 units of
foreign assets. In the next period the F can therefore decrease the amount labor units exploited
by dLft+1 = dR
f
t+1. The net utility gain of doing this strategy is
dUft = −dLft + βdLft+1 = −dRft+1
[
ψ∗t+1 − β
]
.
Again, this confirms that in any any equilibrium β ≤ ψ∗. Q.E.D
Proof of Lemma 5.
Consider the case where â∗f > aˇ. It becomes obvious from Lemma 1 that the terms of trade
in the F ’s local DM are fixed regardless of the amount of foreign assets the F chooses to hold.
Hence by taking the first order condition of e.q.(13) with respect to â∗, we obtain
JFâ∗(â
∗) = −ψ∗ + β ≤ 0,
where the weak inequality sign comes from Lemma (4). From this one can easily verify that the
optimal choice of foreign asset holdings for the F can be no greater than or equal to aˇ unless
ψ∗ = β. We now consider the second case where â∗f ≤ aˇ. Again following from the bargaining
solution in Lemma (1) we have a FOC as
JFâ∗(â
∗) = −ψ∗ + β + σβ {u′(q(a∗f ))− 1} .
This justifies the optimality condition in Lemma 5. For the uniqueness of a˜∗f , we need following
observations. Given the strict concavity assumption of agent’s utility function, it is easy to
understand that the second derivative of the F ’s objective function with respect to â∗ is strictly
negative, i.e., JFâ∗â∗(â
∗) < 0 for all â∗ ∈ (0, aˇ]. Furthermore, one can also easily show that the
following two conditions must hold in the limit.
lim
â∗→0
JFâ∗(â
∗) > 0,
lim
â∗→aˇ−
JFâ∗(â
∗) ≤ 0.
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Combining all these results above, we can finally conclude that the optimal choice of a˜∗f is
unique, and it satisfies a˜∗f ∈ (0, aˇ) when ψ∗ < β. On the other hand, if ψ∗ happens to be same
as β then, the F ’s optimal foreign asset holdings could be either same as aˇ or anything bigger
than that. Q.E.D
Proof of Lemma 6.
With regard to the optimal home asset holdings (a˜), one can refer to the proof of Lemma 5 since
the exactly same line of reasoning applies. From Lemma 3 and 3, one can infer the parameter
space of (ψ∗, a∗f ) that is consistent with the optimal choice of a˜∗h in each of the six regions.
Region 1: First, from Lemma 3, the optimality requires that ψ∗ = β. Second, Lemma 3 restricts
a˜∗h to be greater than or equal to c(κ˜)/β.
Region 2: The optimality condition based on Lemma 3 asks ψ∗−β = χhβ {u′(κ)/c′(κ)− 1}. Since
the Lemma 3 implies κ < κ˜ in this region, the optimality should be consistent with ψ∗ > β.
Region 3: The optimal condition based on Lemma 3 implies ψ∗ = β. At the same time, Lemma
3 pins down the a˜∗h such that a˜∗h = R++ ≥ c(κ˜)/β − σ
[
u(q˜)− u(βâ∗f ) + q˜ − βâ∗f
]
/β.
Region 4: Lemma 3 restricts a˜∗h to be less than c(κ˜)/β, and hence implies κ < κ˜. At the same
time, the optimality from Lemma 3 requires ψ∗ − β = χhβ {u′(κ)/c′(κ)− 1}. Combining the
two results, it is obvious that the optimality should be consistent with ψ∗ > β. Nevertheless,
the upper bound of ψ∗ (ψ∗) that is consistent with the optimality should exist. This condition is
attributed to the fact that the Lemma 3 also bounds a˜∗h from below (aˇ− a∗f ). If ψ∗ grows too big,
the optimal amount of a˜∗h defined in Lemma 3 may fall below aˇ−a∗f . In order to prevent this, ψ∗
should be such that it satisfies the optimality, i.e., ψ∗ − β = χhβ {u′(κ)/c′(κ)− 1}) given κ that
guarantees the minimum value of a˜∗h, i.e., c(κ) = σ [u(q˜)− q˜]− σ
[
u(q(â∗f ))− q(â∗f )
]
+ β(aˆ− â∗f ).
To the right side of a¯∗f in Region 6: Similar to the region 4 case, Lemma 3 restricts a˜
∗
h such that
κ < κ˜. Given the optimal condition of ψ∗−β = χhβ
{
u′(κ)/c′(κ)
{
(1− σ) + σu′(βâ∗f )
}− 1} from
Lemma 3, the optimality should imply ψ∗ > β. However, the region 4 case shows that foreign
asset price range of β < ψ∗ < ψ∗ should lead to the a˜∗h, which dominates the one implied by the
optimality in this region. For this reason, only ψ∗ > ψ∗ is compatible with the optimal choice in
this region.
Region 5: From Lemma 3, the optimality requires that ψ∗ = β. Moreover, proof for Lemma 3
restricts a˜∗h to be greater than or equal to a
∗
h,Min.
To the left side of a¯∗f in Region 6: The optimality condition based on Lemma 3 asks ψ
∗ − β =
χhβ
{
u′(κ)/c′(κ)
{
(1− σ) + σu′(βâ∗f )
}− 1}. Since the Lemma 3 implies κ < κ˜ in this region, the
optimality should be consistent with ψ∗ > β.
Rearranging the results above should suffice to explain the H’s optimal choice of foreign asset
holdings. This completes the proof. Q.E.D
Proof of Lemma 7.
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When T ∗ is plentiful: T ∗ ≥ aˇ+ c(κ˜)/β
Figure 3 confirms that the region 1, 2, 3, and 5 could be all potentially possible equilibrium
region. It is obvious from Lemma 5 and 6 that ψ∗ = β if the equilibrium happens to occur in
either of these regions.
(i): Now suppose the equilibrium (a∗h, a
∗
f ) lies in the region 2. Then Lemma 5 tells that a
∗
f > aˇ
must be consistent with ψ∗ = β. Yet, ∂JH2 (âh, â∗h)/∂â
∗
h from the Lemma 3 implies that κ = κ˜
which is a contradiction to Lemma 3. Thus the region 2 can not be the equilibrium region.
(ii): Suppose the equilibrium lies in either of the region 3 or 5. Then the Lemma 5 tells that
ψ∗ > β but again from ∂JH3 (âh, â∗h)/∂â
∗
h or ∂J
H
3 (âh, â
∗
h)/∂â
∗
h from the Lemma 3 indicates
that only ψ∗ = β must be consistent with the H’s optimality. Hence, the region 3 can not
be the equilibrium region either.
(iii): Suppose the equilibrium lies in the region 1. Then the Lemma 5 implies ψ∗ = β. At the
same time, ∂JH1 (âh, â∗h)/∂â
∗
h from the Lemma 3 also confirms that ψ
∗ = β is consistent with
the H’s optimality. Hence, the equilibrium can be achieved in this regions subject to:
1. a∗h ≥ c(κ˜)/β
2. a∗f ≥ aˇ
3. a∗h + a
∗
f = T
∗.
As long as any combination of (a∗h, a
∗
f ) meets the above three conditions, the equilibrium
can be achieved and therefore, the indeterminacy arises in this case.
When T ∗ lies within a moderate range: aˇ ≤ T ∗ < aˇ+ c(κ˜)/β
It is understood that the region 2, 3, and 5 can not be the equilibrium region for the same reason
as in the case of T ∗ ≥ aˇ + c(κ˜)/β. This only leaves us with the region 4 as the only feasible
equilibrium region. Indeed the Lemma 5 and 6 restrict the foreign asset price to be greater than
the fundamental value in this region. Specifically, the two optimal conditions at the market
clearing situation are:
ψ∗ − β = σβ [u′(βa∗f )− 1] , (a.23)
ψ∗ − β = χhβ
[
u′(κ)
c′(κ)
− 1
]
, (a.24)
where c(κ) = β(T ∗−a∗f ) + σ
[
u(q˜)− u(βa∗f )− q˜ + βa∗f
]
.
From e.q(a.23) and (a.24) the following must be satisfied in equilibrium as well.
χh
σ
=
u′(βa∗f )− 1
u′(κ)/c′(κ)− 1 . (a.25)
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Finally let us prove if ∃!a∗f ∈ (a¯∗f , aˇ). By rearranging e.q(a.25), one can define G(a∗f ) as:
G(a∗f ) ≡ σ
{
u′(βa∗f )− 1
}−χh{u′(κ)
c′(κ)
− 1
}
= 0, (a.26)
where c(κ) = β(T ∗ − a∗f ) + σ
[
u(q˜)− u(βa∗f )− q˜ + βa∗f
]
. (a.27)
First, by taking the G(a∗f ) to the limit the following must hold.
lim
a∗f→a¯∗f
+
G(a∗f ) =σ
{
u′(βa¯∗f )− 1
}− χh{u′(κ˜)
c′(κ˜)
− 1
}
(a.28)
=⊕−0 > 0,
lim
a∗f→aˇ−
G(a∗f ) =σ
{
u′(βaˇ)− 1}− χh{u′(κ)
c′(κ)
− 1
}
(a.29)
=0−⊕ < 0,
where the second term in e.q(a.29) becomes a negative value since the κ in the region 4 happens
to be less than κ˜ according to the Lemma 3.
G′(a∗f ) =σβ u
′′(βa∗f )︸ ︷︷ ︸
	
(a.30)
− χh
{
u′′(κ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
	
∂κ
∂a∗f︸︷︷︸
	
c′(κ)−1 − u′c′(κ)−2 c′′(κ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
⊕
∂κ
∂a∗f︸︷︷︸
	
}
< 0.
Finally, all is left to guarantee the uniqueness of equilibrium a∗f is to show that G
′(a∗f ) < 0 as
shown in e.q. a.30 where ∂κ/∂a∗f = −{(1 − σ)β + σu′(βa∗f )}/c′(κ) < 0 from the e.q(a.27). This
provesG′(a∗f ) < 0 and therefore, the uniqueness of the equilibrium in the region 4 is established.
When T ∗ is scarce: T ∗ ≤ aˇ
Potentially the equilibrium a∗h, a
∗
f can be in either region 5 and 6. Again It is obvious that the
region 5 can not be the equilibrium region for the same reason in the previous two cases. This
only leaves us with the region 6 as the only feasible equilibrium region. Indeed the Lemma 5
and 6 restrict the foreign asset price to be greater than the fundamental value in this region.
Specifically, the two optimal conditions are:
ψ∗ − β = σβ [u′(βa∗f )− 1] , (a.31)
ψ∗ − β = χhβ [u′(κ)/c′(κ) {(1− σ) + σu′(βT ∗)} − 1] , (a.32)
where c(κ) =β(T ∗ − a∗f ) + σ
[
u(βT ∗)− u(βa∗f ) + β(T ∗ − a∗f )
]
.
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From e.q(a.31) and (a.32) the following must be satisfied in equilibrium as well.
χh
σ
=
u′(βa∗f )− 1
u′(κ)/c′(κ) {(1− σ) + σu′(βT ∗)} − 1 . (a.33)
Finally let us prove if ∃!a∗f ∈ (0, aˇ). By rearranging e.q(a.33), one can define Z(a∗f ) as
Z(a∗f ) ≡ σ
{
u′(βa∗f )− 1
}−χh{u′(κ)
c′(κ)
{
(1− σ) + σu′(βT ∗)}− 1} = 0, (a.34)
where c(κ) = β(T ∗ − a∗f ) + σ
[
u(βT ∗)− u(βa∗f ) + β(T ∗ − a∗f )
]
. (a.35)
First, by taking the Z(a∗f ) to the limit the following must hold.
lim
a∗f→0+
Z(a∗f ) =σ
{
u′(β0)− 1}− χh{u′(κ)
c′(κ)
{
(1− σ) + σu′(βT ∗)}− 1} (a.36)
=∞−⊕ > 0,
lim
a∗f→aˇ−
Z(a∗f ) =σ
{
u′(q˜)− 1}− χh{u′(κ)
c′(κ)
{
(1− σ) + σu′(βT ∗)}− 1} (a.37)
=0−⊕ < 0,
where the second term in e.q(a.37) becomes a negative value since the κ in the region 6 happens
to be less than κ˜ according to the Lemma 3. Finally all is left to guarantee the uniqueness of
equilibrium a∗f is to show that Z
′(a∗f ) < 0. By taking the first derivative of Z(a
∗
f ) function with
respect to a∗f , the following equation must hold true.
Z ′(a∗f ) =σβ u
′′(βa∗f )︸ ︷︷ ︸
	
(a.38)
− χh
{
(1− σ) + σu′(βT ∗)}︸ ︷︷ ︸
⊕
{
u′′(κ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
	
∂κ
∂a∗f︸︷︷︸
	
c′(κ)−1 − u′c′(κ)−2 c′′(κ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
⊕
∂κ
∂a∗f︸︷︷︸
	
}
< 0,
where u′(βT ∗) ≤ u′(q˜) = 1 and ∂κ/∂a∗f = −{(1 − σ)β + σu′(βa∗f )}/c′(κ) < 0 from the e.q(a.35).
This proves Z ′(a∗f ) < 0 and therefore, the uniqueness of the equilibrium in the region 4 is
established. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1.
We first prove for the effects of T ∗ on various equilibrium objects. To that end, we separately
provide proofs for each case, i,e., aˇ < T ∗ ≤ aˇ+ c(κ˜)/β and T ∗ < aˇ.
When aˇ < T ∗ ≤ aˇ+ c(κ˜)/β
It is obvious that the home country would on aggregate hold on to home assets exceeding the
43
first best amount aˇ. Then from Lemma 6, ψ = β must hold in equilibrium. Since the proof
for the Lemma 7 confirms ψ∗ > β for the case aˇ < T ∗ ≤ aˇ + c(κ˜)/β, it should be easy to see
ψ∗ > ψ. For comparative statics, now recall the e.q(a.23) and (a.24). Instead of performing the
total differentiation to the optimal conditions, one can simply conduct a thought experiment
using the e.q.(a.23) and (a.24). Starting with an equilibrium situation, suppose T ∗ all of sudden
increases. Then by e.q.(a.23), ψ∗ must remain unchanged and also by e.q(a.24) κ must remain
same. But by the c(κ) function in e.q(a.24), κ must also go up which is a contradiction. Now
let us suppose a∗f falls and a
∗
h rises. Then by e.q(a.23) ψ
∗ must increase which in turn imply
a fall in κ by the e.q(a.24). Yet the c(κ) function in e.q(a.24) again forces κ to increase, which
contradicts the fall in κ by the e.q(a.24). Therefore these thought experiments leaves us with
nothing but ∂a∗f/∂T
∗ > 0 and ∂ψ∗/∂T ∗ < 0. Having the effects of ∆T ∗ on ψ∗ and a∗f established,
one can further pursue the same experiments with the a∗h and κ. Since ∂ψ
∗/∂T ∗ < 0 for sure,
the e.q(a.24) also makes κ rise in response to the increase in κ. Consequently, the increase in κ
and the c(κ) function in the e.q(a.24) also forces a∗h to go up in equilibrium as κ goes up. To sum
up, it must be also true that in equilibrium ∂a∗h/∂T
∗ > 0 and ∂κ/∂T ∗ > 0.
When T ∗ < aˇ
it is easily understood why both ψ∗ and ψ exceed the β in equilibrium. For the ψ∗ > ψ in
equilibrium, one could simply recall the e.q(a.31) and the optimal condition for the home asset
holdings by the home agent in Lemma 6 as:
ψ − β = σβ {u′(βT )− 1} ,
ψ∗ − β = σ {u′(β(T ∗ − a∗h))− 1} .
Since βT ∗ > β(T ∗ − a∗h) when a∗h ∈ (0, T ∗), ψ∗ > ψ must hold in equilibrium. For comparative
statics, the exactly same kind of experiments in the preceding case could be conducted. Recall
the e.q(a.31) and (a.32). Let us imagine a situation where κ rises from the initial steady state.
Suppose ∆a∗f = 0 and a
∗
h goes up in response. Then by the e.q(a.31), ∂ψ
∗/∂T ∗ = 0 ad by
the e.q(a.32), ∂κ/∂T ∗ < 0. But these would mean in accordance with the c(κ) function in the
e.q(a.32) that a∗h must fall which is a contradiction. Now suppose a
∗
f goes up and a
∗
h decreases
instead. Then by the same cost function, κ must increase and at the same time ψ∗ should fall.
However by the e.q(a.31) the ψ∗ must rise so again the contradiction arises. Hence ∂a∗f/∂T
∗ > 0
and ∂ψ∗/∂T ∗ < 0 must be true just like the preceding example. Nevertheless the effects of ∆T ∗
on the κ and a∗h are this time ambiguous. The e.q(a.32) reveals that given the increase in κ the
rise in a∗f and the fall in ψ
∗ can not guarantee the signs of ∂a∗h/∂T
∗ and ∂κ/∂T ∗. Basically this
has been caused by the effect of the terms inside the square bracket in the RHS of e.q(a.32), i.e.,
(1−σ)+σu′(βT ∗), which generates additional downward pressure for the expected surplus from
carrying the asset in the case of rising κ. Therefore without this term, this thought experiment
would have resulted in exactly same results as the preceding case especially the ∂a∗h/∂T
∗ > 0
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and ∂κ/∂T ∗ > 0. But since this term is present, the upward pressure for the a∗h would be
somewhat mitigated. Depending on the parameter values, the precise effect would vary. At
least though it is obvious that the positive effect of κ changes on the a∗h in this scarce κ case is
smaller than the one in the less scarce case of aˇ < T ∗ ≤ aˇ+ c(κ˜)/β.
Next, we provide proofs for the effects of χh on the various equilibrium objects. An easy proof
could be done by a similar thought experiment as in Proposition 1. Recall the e.q(a.31) and
(a.32). Suppose χh increases and as a result ψ∗ remains same and κ goes up. Then by the
cost function in e.q(a.32), it must be true that a∗h rises while a
∗
f falls. But then since a
∗
f falls the
e.q(a.31) implies an increase in ψ∗ which is a contradiction. Now suppose κ remains same while
ψ∗ increases but this generates an immediate contradiction from the e.q(a.32). Next suppose the
κ falls down and ψ∗ increases instead. But again from the cost function, a∗h must decrease which
would automatically imply an increase in the level of a∗f by the market clearing condition. This
combined with the e.q(a.31) would simply mean a fall in the equilibrium level of ψ∗ which is
again a contradiction. Lastly now suppose χh increases along with κ and ψ∗. Then since κ goes
up it is easily understood that a∗h increases while a
∗
f falls from the cost function. Again since
a∗f falls the e.q(a.31) implies an increase in ψ
∗ which is consistent with the assumption. This
completes the proof. Q.E.D
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Figure 1: Aggregate Trends for International Reserves & OTC Inflows
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Figure 2: Timing of Events
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Figure 3: Regions of the FIM Bargaining Solution
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Figure 4: Home Agent’s Foreign Asset Demand Given Different Levels of â∗f
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Figure 5: Aggregate Regions of (a∗h, a
∗
f ) in Equilibrium
Figure 6: Regions of the FIM Bargaining Solution (βaˇ+ σ [u(q˜)− q˜] ≤ c(κ˜))
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Table 1: Countries Included in the Sample
East and Central Asia
Bangladesh Malaysia*
Cambodia Mongolia
China, P.R.: Mainland* Nepal
China: Hong Kong S.A.R.* Pakistan
India* Philippines*
Indonesia* Singapore*
Korea, Rep.* Sri Lanka
Kazakhstan Tajikistan
Kyrgyz Republic Thailand*
Lao People’s Dem. Rep. Vietnam
Oil-producing countries
Algeria Lebanon
Bahrain Libya
Jordan Morocco
Egypt Oman
Israel* Saudi Arabia
Kuwait Tunisia
Latin America
Argentina* Honduras
Bolivia Mexico*
Brazil* Nicaragua
Chile* Panama*
Colombia* Paraguay
Costa Rica Peru*
Dominican Republic Uruguay
El Salvador Venezuela, Rep.*
Guatemala
East Europe & Others
Albania Latvia
Armenia Lithuania
Belarus Macedonia
Bosnia and Herzegovina Poland*
Bulgaria Romania
Croatia* Russia*
Czech Republic Slovak Republic
Estonia Slovenia
Georgia South Africa*
Moldova Turkey
Hungary* Ukraine
* indicates countries that private venture capital
data are available
50
Table 2: Summary Statistics
Variables Observations Mean Std. Dev
Reserves/GDP 1371 0.173 0.164
OTC inflows(Debt+FDI) 1371 0.046 0.058
OTC inflows(Debt only) 1371 0.041 0.054
Venture capital 144 0.108 0.417
Financial openness
(defacto) 1371 1.95 3.515
Financial openness
(dejure) 1341 0.344 0.475
(log) Population 1371 16.490 1.546
(log) GDP per capita 1371 8.869 0.902
M2/GDP 1371 0.502 0.379
Trade openness (Import
to GDP) 1371 0.461 0.287
(log) Terms of trade 1371 4.621 0.211
Exchange rate volatility 1371 0.026 0.081
Peg 1371 0.295 0.456
Soft peg 1371 0.344 0.475
Currency crisis 1371 0.026 0.158
Banking crisis 1371 0.102 0.303
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Table 3: Benchmark results, OTC Inflows and Reserves/GDP
Simultaneous Equations Model (3SLS)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Var. OTC Inflows OTC Inflows
Venture Capital Venture Capital
Inflows Inflows
Reserves/GDP
0.2629*** 0.2835*** 0.9032*** 0.6047***
(0.0084) (0.0082) (0.1416) (0.1049)
Financial Openness
0.0017*** 0.0032
(0.0004) (0.0023)
Dependent Var. Reserves/GDP
OTC or Venture Capital Inflows
2.7264*** 2.2591*** 0.9051*** 0.1912***
(0.0787) (0.0825) (0.0830) (0.0594)
Financial Openness
0.0081*** 0.0379***
(0.0010) (0.0023)
Observations 1,519 1,519 160 160
Standard errors are in parentheses. Country fixed effects, year fixed effects and
crisis dummies are included but not reported
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%
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Table 4: Main results, A Full System of Equations
Simultaneous Equations Model (3SLS)
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent var. OTC Inflows
Reserves/GDP 0.1496*** 0.1855*** 0.1538***
(0.0114) (0.0105) (0.0113)
Financial openness 0.0025*** 0.0026***
(0.0005) (0.0005)
ln Pop. -0.0054*** -0.0067*** -0.0054***
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010)
ln GDPcap -0.0009 -0.0004 -0.0013
(0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018)
R2 0.208 0.169 0.205
Dependent var. Reserves/GDP
OTC Inflows 0.3828*** 0.4842*** 0.4538***
(0.0902) (0.0890) (0.0881)
Financial Openness 0.0013 0.0022**
(0.0010) (0.0010)
ln Pop. 0.0143*** 0.0150*** 0.0142***
(0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0022)
ln GDPcap 0.0262*** 0.0251*** 0.0268***
(0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0035)
M2/GDP 0.1539*** 0.1486*** 0.1544***
(0.0099) (0.0097) (0.0097)
Trade openness 0.2438*** 0.2355*** 0.2446***
(0.0152) (0.0151) (0.0150)
ln TOT 0.1108*** 0.1070*** 0.1090***
(0.0130) (0.0128) (0.0129)
Exchange rate volatility -0.0449 -0.0433 -0.0418
(0.0337) (0.0333) (0.0336)
Peg -0.0124* -0.0120* -0.0119*
(0.0072) (0.0071) (0.0072)
Soft peg 0.0092 0.0088 0.0088
(0.0065) (0.0064) (0.0065)
R2 0.622 0.615 0.617
Observations 1,371 1,371 1,371
Standard errors are in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Country fixed effects, year fixed effects and crisis dummies
are included but not reported
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Table 5: Robustness Check I, Alternative Financial Openness (Chinn-Ito 2008)
Simultaneous Equations Model (3SLS)
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent var. OTC Inflows
Reserves/GDP 0.1741*** 0.1780*** 0.1748***
(0.0106) (0.0106) (0.0106)
Financial Openness (Chinn-Ito) 0.0033*** 0.0033***
(0.0012) (0.0012)
ln Pop -0.0059*** -0.0070*** -0.0059***
(0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0011)
ln GDPcap -0.0016 -0.0001 -0.0017
(0.0020) (0.0019) (0.0020)
R2 0.181 0.174 0.181
Dependent var. Reserves/GDP
OTC Inflows 0.3918*** 0.3999*** 0.3996***
(0.0893) (0.0892) (0.0885)
Financial Openness (Chinn-Ito) 0.0001 0.0014
(0.0012) (0.0023)
ln Pop 0.0144*** 0.0148*** 0.0144***
(0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0023)
ln GDPcap 0.0273*** 0.0265*** 0.0272***
(0.0038) (0.0037) (0.0036)
M2/GDP 0.1549*** 0.1544*** 0.1546***
(0.0098) (0.0098) (0.0098)
Trade Openness 0.2542*** 0.2534*** 0.2538***
(0.0152) (0.0152) (0.0152)
ln TOT 0.1121*** 0.1118*** 0.1119***
(0.0132) (0.0132) (0.0132)
Exchange rate volatility -0.0317 -0.0316 -0.0317
(0.0352) (0.0352) (0.0350)
Peg -0.0131* -0.0131* -0.0131*
(0.0074) (0.0073) (0.0073)
Soft peg 0.0075 0.0074 0.0074
(0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0066)
R2 0.621 0.620 0.620
Observations 1,341 1,341 1,341
Standard errors are in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Country fixed effects, Year fixed effects and Crisis dummy
are included but not reported
54
Table 6: Robustness Check II, Direct OTC measure, Venture capital
Simultaneous Equations Model (3SLS)
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent var. OTC Inflows: Private Venture Capital
Reserves/GDP 1.0567*** 0.4883*** 0.9922***
(0.3578) (0.1578) (0.3523)
Financial Openness -0.0301* -0.0258
(0.0169) (0.0166)
ln Pop -0.0180 0.0089 -0.0147
(0.0346) (0.0311) (0.0345)
ln GDPcap 0.0263 0.0517 0.0248
(0.0884) (0.0872) (0.0883)
R2 0.077 0.108 0.083
Dependent var. Reserves/GDP
Venture Capital Inflows 0.1272*** 0.1304*** 0.1463***
(0.0253) (0.0252) (0.0250)
Financial Openness 0.0104** 0.0090*
(0.0048) (0.0047)
ln Pop 0.0453*** 0.0452*** 0.0469***
(0.0066) (0.0066) (0.0067)
ln GDPcap 0.0921*** 0.0938*** 0.0940***
(0.0172) (0.0172) (0.0176)
M2/GDP 0.0555** 0.0573*** 0.0649***
(0.0222) (0.0221) (0.0221)
Trade Openness 0.2544*** 0.2627*** 0.3514***
(0.0515) (0.0512) (0.0255)
ln TOT 0.0018 0.0018 0.0196
(0.0315) (0.0315) (0.0310)
Exchange rate volatility -1.0167** -1.0500** -1.2063***
(0.4416) (0.4406) (0.4398)
Peg 0.0168 0.0174 0.0033
(0.0301) (0.0300) (0.0300)
Soft peg 0.0453** 0.0468** 0.0411**
(0.0183) (0.0183) (0.0185)
R2 0.910 0.909 0.902
Observations 145 145 145
Standard errors are in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Country fixed effects, year fixed effects and crisis dummies
are included but not reported
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Table 7: Robustness Check III, Another OTC measure
Simultaneous Equations Model (3SLS)
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent var. OTC Inflows: Debt liability only
Reserves/GDP 0.1746*** 0.1991*** 0.1768***
(0.0104) (0.0095) (0.0103)
Financial Openness 0.0016*** 0.0017***
(0.0005) (0.0004)
ln Pop -0.0059*** -0.0067*** -0.0059***
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009)
ln GDPcap -0.0059*** -0.0056*** -0.0062***
(0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017)
R2 0.210 0.182 0.208
Dependent var. Reserves/GDP
OTC Inflows 0.6353*** 0.7244*** 0.6875***
(0.0936) (0.0922) (0.0924)
Financial Openness 0.0012 0.0020**
(0.0010) (0.0010)
ln Pop 0.0150*** 0.0156*** 0.0148***
(0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0022)
ln GDPcap 0.0279*** 0.0275*** 0.0289***
(0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0035)
M2/GDP 0.1469*** 0.1418*** 0.1475***
(0.0097) (0.0096) (0.0095)
Trade Openness 0.2263*** 0.2184*** 0.2275***
(0.0156) (0.0154) (0.0153)
ln TOT 0.1041*** 0.1005*** 0.1027***
(0.0129) (0.0127) (0.0128)
Exchange rate volatility -0.0407 -0.0393 -0.0382
(0.0332) (0.0327) (0.0330)
Peg -0.0118* -0.0114 -0.0113
(0.0071) (0.0070) (0.0071)
Soft peg 0.0085 0.0082 0.0082
(0.0064) (0.0063) (0.0064)
R2 0.614 0.606 0.609
Observations 1,371 1,371 1,371
Standard errors are in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Country fixed effects, year fixed effects and crisis dummies
are included but not reported
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